• President John Mahama conducted a minor cabinet reshuffle on 06 August, with changes made to four ministerial portfolios.
• The reshuffle comes amid a series of shifts in the political environment, including an ongoing constitutional reform process.
• The reshuffle is not anticipated to have any notable impact on policy positioning.
• The proposed constitutional amendment and a change to the delegate system for internal elections could strengthen the political position of the Mahama administration.
• The political opposition is likely to push back against some provisions within the planned amendment, which could lead to protest action, but this not expected to devolve into widespread demonstrations or unrest.

President John Mahama conducted a minor cabinet reshuffle on 07 August.

Old and new

The reshuffle, which was the first undertaken since Mahama appointed his initial cabinet in January 2025, included four changes. Two ministers have been put forward for a change in portfolio; minister of works, housing and water Kenneth Gilbert Adjei was nominated as defence minister, while local government minister Ahmed Ibrahim was assigned to Adjei’s former portfolio. In addition, two newcomers were proposed to join the government. Zanetor Agyemang-Rawlings and Mahama Ayariga were placed at the head of the environment ministry and local government ministry respectively.

All four of the appointees are established political figures. Prior to his current ministerial role, Adjei had served as deputy minister of defence from 2015 to 2017 during Mahama’s first term as president. Similarly, Ibrahim had been a legislator for the ruling NDC party since 2009, before his appointment as local government minister. Both Agyeman-Rawlings and Ayariga currently serve as NDC legislators, the former since 2015 and the latter since 2005. At the time of his latest appointment, Ayariga was serving as leader of the majority caucus in parliament. He has since been replaced by James Agalga.

A statement released by the office of the presidency indicated that the cabinet changes were made to “enhance the effectiveness of the government”. However, the reshuffle was largely necessitated by a gap in the cabinet created by a helicopter crash in August 2025, in which then-defence minister Edward Omane Boamah and environment minister Ibrahim Murtala Muhammed were killed. The two ministerial roles were held on a temporary basis by other ministers over the past year.

Governance under scrutiny

The cabinet reshuffle occurred shortly after a protest march held by the main opposition NPP party in Accra on 06 August, to commemorate the anniversary of the helicopter crash. The planned demonstration was labelled “democracy under attack” and organised to draw attention to various grievances. The NPP accused the government of political persecution, selective justice, and abuse of state institutions. The march was attended by hundreds of NPP supporters, who protested along a pre-approved route between the Supreme Court and Jubilee House. The march involved handing petitions detailing the party’s grievances to members of the judiciary, parliament and the office of the presidency. The protest was largely peaceful, with a heavy police presence along the route.

System changes

The protest was reportedly catalysed by several recent judicial decisions criticised by the NPP. This included an acquittal by the Court of Appeal on 30 July of former chief executive of the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre, Sedina Tamakloe Attionu, who had been convicted on money laundering charges. Another was the 20-year sentence given to NPP Ashanti region chairman Bernard Antwi Boasiako on 21 July over charges related to illegal mining.

The NPP has also heavily criticised a Supreme Court ruling on 29 July that the delegate system used by political parties to nominate electoral candidates is unconstitutional. The court ruled that the system undermines democratic principles included in the country’s constitution. Instead, the court has indicated that all political parties must ensure that every card-bearing member in good standing is able to participate in primary elections. Parties have been given a year to comply with the ruling. The delegate system had entailed smaller internal party elections with voting by a select number of delegates (including constituency executives, regional officials and selected local leaders). This included elections for party leadership and to select candidates for national elections.

The ruling has garnered divergent responses. The NPP issued a statement on 05 August to reject the decision. The party’s director of elections, Evans Nimako, indicated that it would place a significant financial burden on political parties. He also indicated that the delegate system was an entrenched part of the country’s democracy and that the change could lead to further debate over whether the state should provide funding for political parties.

Conversely, the NDC party has welcomed the judgement and declared its intent to implement fully fledged primary elections going forward. The party’s deputy director for elections, Rashid Tanko Computer, noted on 29 July that the NDC considers the ruling to be “fair” and had already begun to consider strengthening its membership database beforehand. Similarly, NDC national chairman Johnson Asiedu Nketiah indicated on 05 August that the ruling would increase the costs of internal elections, particularly related to the procurement of ballot papers, but that the ruling party will be ready for the change within a year.

Readying for reform

The upcoming change to the system for internal elections is set to be one of several shifts to the country’s political system over the coming years, due to an ongoing constitutional reform process. To this end, the government issued a white paper on 30 July to endorse more than 200 recommended constitutional changes put forward by the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC). The proposed amendments had initially been presented by the CRC in December 2025.

Under the amendment approved by the government, presidential and parliamentary terms will be shifted from four to five years. Candidate eligibility requirements have also been changed, with the minimum age for presidential candidates dropped from 40 to 35 years and dual citizens enabled to run for legislative and ministerial positions (other than that of president and vice president). Additional revisions were put forward to the structure of political institutions. Specifically, the number of seats in parliament will be increased from 276 to a ceiling of 300, with up to 24 extra seats to be allocated through proportional representation and reserved for women, youth, and individuals with disabilities. The membership of the Supreme Court will also be capped at 19. There are currently 18 justices of the Supreme Court, but no official limit is provided in the 1992 constitution. The number of ministers appointed by the president will be capped at 60, while the current government has 43 ministers (including regional ministers), previous governments have had up to 110.

The amendment also puts forward a clearer timeline for elections. Should they go ahead, presidential and parliamentary elections would be held in the first week of November (instead of December). Electoral challenges must then be filed within 14 days after the announcement of results, and the Supreme Court is given 30 further days to respond. The amended timeline is intended to provide greater time for electoral disputes and effective management of the elections by the Electoral Commission, prior to the inauguration of any new government in early January. Other key changes include the abolition of the death penalty and removal of tax exemption for the president.

While the government accepted many of the proposed political changes, some financial management recommendations were rejected for cost reasons. These included stronger disclosure rules for public debt and liabilities from state-owned enterprises, along with the establishment of an independent fiscal council to scrutinise financial stability. The government indicated that these objectives are included in existing financial management law and do not need to be placed in the constitution.

Following the government’s approval, president John Mahama is set to inaugurate a Constitutional Review Implementation Committee that will prepare two constitutional amendment bills on the recommendations. The first bill will include non-entrenched provisions that only require approval by a two-thirds majority in parliament, while the second will be put to a countrywide referendum. This is set to be held alongside district assembly elections, which are expected to be held in mid-2027, with the exact date yet to be set.

The Signal

The reshuffle is not anticipated to have any notable impact on the government’s policy positioning. The choice of NDC stalwarts and experienced political figures to fill the open cabinet positions highlights a commitment by president John Mahama to continuity. Given that the reshuffle was largely internal, the changes are not expected to lead to any shift in policy trajectory. The Mahama administration’s policy strategy – which is labelled the Resetting Ghana agenda – was reaffirmed in the state of the nation address given by the president in February. Politically, the agenda centres on constitutional reform, governance improvements, and strengthened transparency. Economically, continued improvements to the state’s debt position and finalising the end stages of a debt restructuring process will remain a key priority, along with rebuilding foreign reserves, improving currency stability and the promotion of economic growth through extensive infrastructure investment. Policy stability will be a tailwind for GDP growth over the near term, which is currently forecast by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to measure 4.8 percent in 2026, from 6 percent in 2025. This will be supported by strong gold prices and inflation improvements, with inflation forecast to average around 5.8 percent, down from 14.2 percent in 2025. At present, inflation has remained relatively stable despite global price pressures related to the Middle East crisis, measuring between 3.2 and 5.3 percent monthly since the start of 2026. In the mid-year budgetary review on 23 July, finance minister Cassiel Forson indicated that the government is still targeting a fiscal deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP for 2026. In its latest review published on 04 August, the IMF indicated that public debt currently measures around 54.9 percent of GDP and forecast that this would drop to 52.6 percent by the end of 2026. Nevertheless, the country’s macroeconomic outlook is still subject to various risks, including climate concerns that could impact output in the agriculture sector and vulnerability to external shocks, including price volatility related to the Middle East conflict.

The proposed constitutional amendment and change to the delegate system could strengthen the political position of the Mahama administration and the broader NDC party. With regard to the delegate system, major parties such as the NDC and NPP will be best placed to bear the financial and administrative responsibilities related to a shift to more broad-based participation in internal elections. Both the NPP and NDC have more established support structures and benefit from greater financial backing than minor political parties in the country. As a result, it is possible that the prohibition on the delegate system could further entrench the current two-party system. Nevertheless, the responses to the change highlight that the NDC may be better prepared for the shift than the NPP. This, as the NPP has expressed greater concern over the cost of broader internal ballots, while the NDC already had preparations underway for such a scenario; it indicated following the ruling that it had already been considering more inclusive internal elections and began an audit of its membership database earlier this year as a result. The NDC is also the only party that has already conducted a full membership internal election in the past, having done this on one previous occasion in 2014. Similarly, the constitutional amendment is expected to benefit the current NDC administration. Specifically, the extension of presidential and legislative terms will entrench Mahama’s hold on power and the NDC’s control over parliament at least until the start of 2030. This will provide additional time for the administration to achieve macroeconomic goals and establish its policy trajectory, which could enable the government to hold onto greater support ahead of the next elections. Broadly, risks to political stability will remain low until the next electoral cycle, particularly given the NDC’s legislative majority which will support the forward movement of its political agenda.

The political opposition is likely to push back against some provisions within the planned constitutional amendment. Thus far, official reactions to the proposed constitutional changes by the NPP have been limited. The main opposition party established a committee to review the initial proposals put forward by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) in December, but has yet to release an official statement to support or denounce the proposed amendment. However, the proposed amendment has still received some pushback, including from the National House of Chiefs, which took issue with minor proposed changes to the land administration system. It is likely that some inclusions in the proposed amendment will garner general support across the political environment, including measures intended to improve election management, limit membership in government institutions and thus lower spending on public wages, and broaden political participation. Other inclusions and exclusions may face some backlash, such as insufficient changes to reduce executive influence, along with the extension of presidential and legislative terms. The extension could be viewed by the opposition as an attempt by Mahama and the NDC to prolong their current tenure. The opposition may also express concern over the motivation behind the amendment, given that other African statesmen have used constitutional changes to extend their time in power by arguing that presidential terms were reset under a new constitution. This has occurred previously in Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea. Notably, article 66 of chapter 8 of the 1992 constitution outlines presidential term limits. This chapter is an entrenched provision, so any changes to term limits will form part of the constitutional amendment that is put to referendum. Given that the NDC holds a two-thirds majority in parliament, opposition to the constitutional changes will not prevent the passage of the non-entrenched provisions (which only requires legislative approval). However, the NPP and other minor opposition parties could launch a campaign against the planned second amendment bill to sway public opinion ahead of a referendum. It is possible that the final bills will include some minor changes or additions made to address concerns raised by the opposition and broader public over the proposed amendment in the coming months.

Further opposition-led protests are possible over the coming months, but these is not expected to devolve into widespread demonstrations or unrest. As the constitutional reform process progresses, the opposition could utilise popular mobilisation to voice its concerns over the reform. Similarly, the government has shown little intent to respond to the petitions handed over by the NPP at its latest protest event, with deputy director of operations at the presidency Mustapha Gbande having dismissed the petitions on 06 August and indicated that they would not be read. Enduring grievances over judicial independence and the constitutional reform process could lead to further protests, primarily in Accra, in the near term. Nevertheless, no notable unrest or unsanctioned protest action is expected at this stage. The NPP’s 06 August protest highlighted an intent to operate within established regulations for demonstrations. Future mobilisation should be similarly pre-approved and subject to a strong police presence. Any unrest that does occur would be rapidly subdued. If the government continues to not respond to opposition concerns over governance or the constitutional reform process, this could increase the potential for more significant protest action and localised unrest closer to the 2027 district assembly elections and potential constitutional referendum.