• The UPR party announced on 31 August that finance minister Romuald Wadagni has been nominated as the ruling coalition’s presidential candidate for the 12 April 2026 presidential election.
• Wadagni’s nomination is rooted in several considerations, including his successful tenure as finance minister and his close alignment with president Patrice Talon.
• Wadagni’s candidacy faces various headwinds, such as the absence of a support base.
• Such challenges are likely to be offset by repressed socio-political conditions and an institutional environment which favours the incumbent regime.

The UPR party announced on 31 August that finance minister Romuald Wadagni has been nominated as the ruling coalition’s presidential candidate for the 12 April 2026 presidential election. As per local reports, the announcement was made following closed-door engagements between ruling coalition partners – the UPR and Bloc Republicain – at the Cotonou home of president Patrice Talon on 30 and 31 August. The nomination of Wadagni was unanimous among members present at the meetings. Wadagni has been finance minister since 2016, after having served as director of the quality and risks department for Deloitte’s operations in West Africa.

The announcement follows the release of the official electoral calendar by the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA) on 11 August. According to the schedule, prospective presidential election contenders must submit applications between 10 and 14 October, with the final list due on 31 October.

The Signal

The selection of Romuald Wadagni as the ruling coalition’s flagbearer for the 12 April 2026 elections is rooted in several considerations. There have been few stand-out politicians since president Patrice Talon assumed power in 2016. This, in part, is owed to Talon’s effective consolidation of power since becoming president, which has seen few politicians gain any meaningful noteworthiness. One of the few exceptions in this regard is Wadagni, who has been the key driver of Talon’s favourable economic policies that have become a cornerstone of his administration and popularity. As such, Wadagni’s reputation as being intrinsic to Talon’s broader policy agenda should afford him significant goodwill among the domestic population. Wadagni also represents a continuation of the status quo within the broader coalition. Indeed, Wadagni is considered one of Talon’s closest allies and (as noted above) has been a critical component of the statesman’s broader economic reform programme. Beyond the economy, Wadagni is also said to have been involved in Talon’s approach to tackling extremism in the north of the country and other governance policies, suggesting a broader degree of political collaboration – and ideological alignment – between the two. Wadagni is therefore likely seen within the coalition as an individual that will carry current political interests forward and sustain current reform momentum should he become president. This would be welcomed by both external and internal stakeholders. These factors are coupled with Wadagni’s strong standing within diplomatic circles. This is a result of pragmatic actions as finance minister, his tenure as head of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) Finance Ministers’ Statutory Council (2018 to 2020), his position as World Bank governor, and frequent engagements with diplomatic partners on behalf of Talon in recent years.

Wadagni’s candidacy does face various headwinds. Foremost of these is that Wadagni does not have his own political support base. He has long touted himself as being “apolitical”, with his tenure as finance minister being technocratic in nature. Prior to being finance minister, Wadagni had only worked in the private sector – primarily for Deloitte – and therefore has no local political base that he can utilise to drum up support for the upcoming vote. Wadagni’s candidacy will rely on Talon and the ruling coalition’s popularity to drive his campaign and electoral performance. These factors could weigh on his electoral performance within a political environment where proximity to voters factors into voting behaviour. A second headwind is that while Talon’s economic reform programme is popular for the most part, it has yet to translate into major improvements in socio-economic conditions. Indeed, the reform agenda has helped stabilise Benin’s debt and internal balances, while driving sustained high growth; however, unemployment and staple food prices remain points of contention among the populace. In addition, increased socio-political repression has also been a contentious policy trajectory under Talon. Wadagni’s effective representation of a continuation of this status quo, and lack of political base, may undercut his electoral performance.

Such challenges are likely to be offset by increasingly repressed socio-political conditions and an institutional environment which favours the incumbent regime. While the 2023 legislative election saw a formal return of the political opposition to parliament, by way of the Les Democrats, repressive policies on the part of the Talon administration have largely undermined opposition activity since. This has impeded the chances for a single opposition politician to garner any major support base. The Les Democrats, alongside other opposition parties, has yet to announce its candidates. While there is a possibility that opposition parties will form an alliance, the lack of major support bases will undermine the presentation of a credible challenger at this time. These factors are complimented by what is otherwise an institutional environment that would favour a candidate of the governing coalition. This includes an electoral commission (CENA) and judiciary which are perceived as pliant towards the Talon administration. Already, on 07 August, a coalition of five opposition parties – Les Democrates, MPL, GSR, NFN, and the We Will Do It movement – criticised the CENA for delays in distributing mandatory sponsorship forms and activating the online platform for obtaining tax clearance certificates, both required under the electoral code for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Much like the lead-up to the 2023 vote and 2021 presidential elections, Talon’s influence over key electoral bodies may impede the opposition’s broader participation in the vote. Similarly to 2021 and 2023, pre-electoral controversies and contentions are not expected to be accompanied by any meaningful unrest.