• The transitional government signed a peace accord with multiple rebel groups on 08 August.
• Several of the country’s larger insurgent groups have however, rejected the agreement.
• This will undermine the credibility of a forthcoming national dialogue and could have repercussions for the country’s broader political transition process.

The government signed a peace agreement with several non-state armed actors and opposition groups in Doha, Qatar on 08 August. This represents the end of much-delayed talks, widely referred to as the “pre-dialogue”, between the state and insurgents, which had begun in March.

The talks

The pre-dialogue was intended to set the terms by which rebel groups and opposition organisations participate in what the government describes as an Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI). The DNI was initially scheduled to begin in N’Djamena on 10 May, but has since been postponed to 20 August.

The DNI is a key pillar of the political transition process established by the current government, the Transitional Military Council (CMT), after it assumed power within an hour of the death of former president Idriss Deby on 19 April 2021. Led by the late president’s son Mahamat Deby, and comprised of 15 high-ranking generals, the CMT laid out an 18-month transitional timetable meant to conclude with general elections in October 2022. The CMT’s charter does make provision for a further 18-month governance tenure if, as currently expected, the elections are delayed.

The agreement

Deby arrived in Doha on 05 August for the finalisation of the pre-dialogue and the signing ceremony held on 08 August. While the agreement has yet to be made publicly available, it’s key tenets are believed to include the following:

• An immediate and permanent ceasefire both in Chadian territory and that of neighbouring countries (most armed groups have bases in southern Libya to the north, and Sudan to the east)
• The establishment of a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programme for rebel fighters
• The provision of amnesty for combatants
• The release of prisoners of war (by both the military and armed groups)

The supporters

An estimated 34 insurgent and opposition groups signed the agreement. Some of the more prominent participating rebel groups include the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) and Union forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD). Following the signing of the agreement, Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Padacke stated that the “Doha pre-dialogue has just delivered its verdict in favour of the Chadian people in their quest for peace”.

This view appears to be shared by regional and international bodies. In a video address on 08 August, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Antonio Guterres commended the “transitional authorities and the politico-military groups for their peace efforts, which are bearing fruit today”. African Union (AU) Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, who was present at the Doha signing ceremony, expressed a similar sentiment and re-affirmed that the AU would remain “faithful to its historic commitment to Chad”.

The detractors

The agreement has not been without its detractors. Most notably, an estimated 18 of the original participants in the pre-dialogue have refused to sign. The largest of these groups are the Front for Concord and Change in Chad (FACT) – responsible for the death of Idriss Deby in 2021 – and the Military Command Council of the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR). In an 08 August media interview, FACT leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali claimed that the CMT had “no intention of conducting real discussions leading to a peace agreement”. Mahdi accused the government of bribing participants and of crowding out prominent armed groups by including lesser-known groupings in the pre-dialogue.

The 18 dissenting groups have formed an alliance called the Permanent Framework for Consultation and Reflection (CPCR). The coalition claims that it is still open to negotiations but that several conditions must be met before it would be willing to participate in the forthcoming DNI. Some of the more notable conditions include:

• Barring all members of the CMT, including Deby, from participating in any future elections
• The dissolution and reformation of the DNI’s current organising body
• The reform of the armed forces (the exact nature of which is not specified)

Similar demands were made on 08 August by Wakit Tama, a coalition of opposition and civic groupings, which stated that it would boycott the DNI unless the CMT addressed its concerns.

The CMT has not responded to either the CPCR or Wakit Tama’s demands. Nonetheless, following the conclusion of the signing ceremony in Doha, Deby stated that his “hand remains open and outstretched for whoever wants to grasp it”. He concluded by “appeal[ing] to the still sceptical politico-military movements to take full and complete measure of this historic opportunity for dialogue”.

The Signal

Failure to reach consensus among participants in the Doha pre-dialogue highlights the elevated mistrust between non-state armed actors and the Transitional Military Council (CMT). The fact that certain rebel groups (represented by the CPCR alliance) and political groupings (such as Wakit Tama) have rejected the Doha agreement points to their underlying doubts about President Mahamat Deby’s commitment to the transition process. Their scepticism appears to be rooted in the belief that Deby is ultimately concerned about maintaining his own power (and that of the military) and that the negotiations and dialogue process are simply a means of ensuring the legitimacy of his rule. It is for these reasons that opponents of the pre-dialogue agreement have demanded guarantees that Deby is willing to give up power (by, for example, agreeing not to participate in the next elections). Deby’s apparent reluctance to provide such guarantees has only served to reinforce his opponents’ suspicions. To this end, a conciliation between insurgent groups such as FACT, and the CMT appears unlikely at present.

This could have repercussions for the credibility of the Inclusive National Dialogue (DNI) and the wider transitional process. The absence of FACT (one of the country’s largest insurgent groups) and Wakit Tama (the country’s primary opposition movement) will limit the degree to which the forthcoming dialogue can be perceived as “inclusive”. This could undermine the extent to which the outcomes of the DNI are able to garner public support. Scheduled for 20 August, the DNI is intended to delve into some of the requirements of the transition process, including the establishment of a format and timeline for the holding of national elections, originally slated for October 2022. With limited time to complete the dialogue process and the necessary election-related logistical requirements, the CMT is likely to recommend during the DNI that the electoral calendar be pushed out in order to allow for more time. As per the CMT constitution, the government is permitted to extend the transitional period by a maximum of 18 months from the end of the current transitional period in October. Extending the CMT’s mandate is likely to elicit pushback from the transitional government’s opponents. This could manifest in anti-government protest activity, which would be most likely to take place in the capital N’Djamena.

Nonetheless, the political landscape is expected to remain stable over the short-to-medium term. Despite the apparent failings of the ongoing dialogue process, the CMT’s hold on power has not been compromised. This is principally due to the fact that the CMT is comprised of high-ranking military leaders and continues to command the loyalty of the country’s armed forces. In addition, the CMT maintains the support of important political actors, including the former ruling party (the MPS) and prominent opposition members such as Theophile Bongoro (an opposition candidate who had boycotted the April 2021 presidential elections). Moreover, the CMT continues to enjoy the support of international partners such as the United Nations (UN) and regional bodies such as the African Union (AU). This support could be somewhat compromised if, as expected, the CMT extends the transitional period. However, given the importance of the Chadian military in regional counter-terrorism efforts, international partners are not expected to completely cut diplomatic ties with the CMT, or pursue any material punitive measures.

In a similar vein, the country’s security environment is expected to remain largely stable, at least over the short term. The activities of principal armed groups have largely been halted since the death of former president Idriss Deby in April 2021. This is believed to be due to the CMT’s concerted effort to reach a negotiated settlement with the primary insurgent groups operating in the country’s north. FACT’s rejection of the pre-dialogue agreement and the DNI could compromise relative stability in the country’s security environment. However, at present, the group appears to be willing to continue negotiations with the CMT, rather than resume armed activities. Its formation of an alliance – the CPCR – with the other groups that rejected the pre-dialogue agreement appears to support this claim. As recently as 08 August, the CPCR claimed that it “remains open to discussions anytime and anywhere”. Over the medium term, if negotiations fail to reach a resolution between the CMT and the CPCR, FACT could decide to resume armed activities. But even if FACT does embark on this course of action, any related attacks will likely be limited to the area along the Libyan border. The group is not believed to have the resources or capacity to pose a credible military threat to N’Djamena at present. A final security concern relates to the military’s ongoing counter-insurgency efforts against Islamist extremists operating in the Lake Chad Basin. Insecurity related to these operations is however, likely to be contained within the country’s Lac region.

Finally, the inconclusive outcome of the pre-dialogue is not expected to affect Chad’s near-term economic prospects. In recent months, bilateral and multilateral financial institutions have continued to engage with the CMT. Most recently, in the week of 11 July, Chad’s official creditor committee was reported to have met to discuss the restructuring of Chad’s USD 3 billion external debt under the G20’s common framework (which was approved in principle in June 2021). However, in order for the debt restructuring to be approved, the creditor committee expects Chad to reach similar terms with commercial creditors (particularly commodity trader Glencore, which is estimated to account for nearly a third of Chad’s external debt). An agreement with Glencore is also required so that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board can approve the first review of a 36-month, USD 570.75 million Extended Credit Facility (ECF) signed in December 2021. To this end, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva called on Glencore on 11 July to “step forward”. In response, Glencore stated that “we continue to engage with all stakeholders and look forward to a positive outcome soon”. Achieving debt restructuring under the common framework would help significantly to ameliorate Chad’s risk of debt distress (described by the World Bank as high as a result of recent negative growth, declining buffers, and high foreign-denominated interest payments).