• The FACT rebel group announced on 18 August an end to a ceasefire that it declared unilaterally in 2021, and further stated that it would launch an imminent offensive against the transitional government.
• FACT’s statement came in response to an alleged air strike on its positions in Libya by the Chadian military.
• A large-scale offensive by the FACT rebel group into Chad remains unlikely at this time given internal dynamics and operational constraints.
• Even should FACT seek to launch a major operation into Chad, it would quickly be thwarted by the military, which has expanded its capabilities since repelling the rebel group’s offensive in 2021.
• Any offensive by FACT or another rebel group against the transitional government would prompt external support given Chad’s importance for stability in the region.

The FACT rebel group announced on 18 August an end to a ceasefire that it declared unilaterally in 2021. In a statement published on social media, FACT indicated that the announcement comes in response to air strikes on one of its bases by the Chadian military in southern Libya – from where the rebel group operates – resulting in three deaths. FACT went on to state that Chad’s transitional government had “declared war on us” and that its “reaction will be quick and unrestrained”.

FACT – formed in 2016 by military officers who defected from the Chadian military – launched a major incursion into Chad from Libya on 11 April 2021 and attempted to advance on N’Djamena. At the time, it was estimated that FACT had well over 1,000 fighters, and were equipped with extensive weaponry and artillery, which alongside vehicles, had been sourced from the Libyan National Army (LNA). In this respect, FACT had been contracted as a defensive force for the LNA between 2017 and 2019, affording it access to various ordnance. Its provisions in this regard assisted the group in launching a surprise offensive in Chad in April 2021, with FACT fighters making it as far as Kanem region – around 300 kilometres from the capital – before Chadian forces managed to halt the advance. The Kanem region had been the site of the majority of clashes between security forces and FACT militants, including the altercation which resulted in the death of then-president Idriss Deby on 19 April.

Shortly after this, FACT declared its unilateral ceasefire. This declaration coincided with major military offensives by the Chadian army, resulting in around 440 FACT fighters being captured and scores of others killed. On 09 May, the military claimed it had defeated FACT within Chad’s borders. Despite being responsible for the death of the former president, FACT was invited to attend the transitional government’s national dialogue process in October 2022; however, the group joined other rebels, political parties and civic organisations in boycotting the dialogue due to their perception that the initiative lacked legitimacy and sincerity.

Transitional president Mahamat Deby nonetheless sought to extend the proverbial olive branch to the rebel group on 25 March 2023, when he pardoned roughly 380 captured FACT fighters – after they were handed life sentences on 21 March. At the time, Deby confirmed that the transitional government was still open to dialogue. This was rejected by FACT given that the pardon did not apply to dozens of senior members of the rebel group. As most of the group’s leadership live in exile, they were sentenced (also on 21 March) in absentia to life in prison. This includes FACT’s leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali, who currently resides in France.

Deby once again presented dialogue as an option to all rebel groups during a statement issued on 20 August. Speaking from the Kouri 60 area (Tibesti region) – near the border with Libya – Deby conveyed than any rebel group has two options: war or dialogue. Deby had arrived in Kouri 60 several days prior after an alleged attack on the towns of Wour and Kouri, in Tibesti, by the CCMSR militant group (also based in Libya) on 09 and 10 August; the CCMSR maintains an operational presence along the shared frontier, where it carries out indiscriminate acts of violence against military interests. Unlike FACT, however, the CCMSR has shown no operational capacity to extend its insurgency beyond these border areas.

While Deby did not specifically reference FACT in his statement, he ostensibly referred to the group when asserting that the Chadian military had not conducted any air strikes in Libya and that any that such claims were false. Deby concluded by expressing that the “door to dialogue” remains open, but that should this path not be chosen, he will be waiting in Kouri 60 for anyone who “thinks he has the strength” to act against him.

The Signal

A large-scale offensive by the FACT rebel group into Chad remains unlikely at this time. It is assessed that FACT has yet to completely recover from its loss in April/May 2021. In addition to the loss of personnel, FACT had scores of vehicles and weaponry destroyed or seized by the Chadian military. FACT is believed to have external funding sources in Europe – specifically France – which alongside a pervasive illicit arms market in North Africa suggests that the rebel group could have begun to replenish its weapon stockpiles since 2021. However, FACT has not had the support of the Libyan National Army (LNA) since 2019, suggesting that its ability to procure the extent of weaponry and other military hardware it had when launching its April 2021 offensive is unlikely. Equally unlikely is FACT’s ability to restore its personnel numbers to the over 1,000 fighters it had in 2021. In this respect, it is perceived that the group has faced somewhat of an internal crisis following its loss in 2021. Key figures such as FACT leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali and his advisor, Mahamat Bahar Kendji, have remained in exile in Europe since mid-2021 to avoid any possible capture, while lower-level senior members were captured and sentenced to prison. The absence of these figures from the group’s operations in Libya would have likely eroded morale and efforts to recover. In this respect, a video posted by FACT on social media on 12 July showed Kendji addressing FACT soldiers (amounting to no more than 500/600). The post confirmed that this was Kendji’s first in-person address to FACT’s fighters in over two years, and that he had found the movement “in struggle”. Accordingly, FACT is unlikely to launch a major offensive into Chad given current internal dynamics and operational constraints.

Even should FACT seek to launch another major operation into Chad, it would quickly be thwarted by the military. Such a move by FACT cannot be entirely discounted, as the group could have recovered beyond current assessments and/or could hope to exploit dissatisfaction with the transitional government to aid its offensive. In its 18 August statement, FACT made repeated references to what it described as the authoritarian transitional government and the need to liberate Chad’s “oppressed” population. However, any attempts to galvanise support locally are unlikely to be unsuccessful. While there are indeed domestic grievances over oppression by the state, there is little to suggest these are to the degree that would see the population support any attempted overthrow of the government. More importantly, transitional president Mahamat Deby maintains a strong command over the armed forces, which has grown more congruent under the statesman’s tenure and would vehemently oppose any attempt to depose the current regime. The military’s growing congruence under Deby has also coincided with expansion of its overall operational capacity. The transitional government has significantly enhanced its military spending, which has translated in the acquisition of more modern weaponry, including drones, as well as expanding existing hardware such as fighter planes and armoured vehicles. As such, even if FACT has sufficiently recovered, any renewed offensive into Chad would be quickly contained by a military that is even more advanced than the one which repelled the rebel group in 2021. In addition, what appears to be a troop build-up in Tibesti region suggests that FACT will be impeded in its ability to advance beyond the administrative division as it had done in 2021 before being defeated.

Any offensive by FACT or another rebel group against the transitional government would also prompt external support given Chad’s importance for stability in the region. Following successive coups in the region – the most recent being in Niger in April – Chad has become strategically important for regional and Western peers. Any regime change in Chad that could arise from a rebel offensive would further compromise regional security initiatives that have been impacted by the recent coups in Mali and Burkina Faso – and potentially Niger. In this respect, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been particularly concerned over the expansion of extremist violence in the region in the wake of these coups. Chad also remains one of the few major security allies for the West in the Sahel, with the recent waves of coups prompting the severance of ties by affected states with Western partners – most notably France – in favour of Russia. Chad’s importance to the region’s wider stability suggests that any offensives by a rebel group to topple the transitional government would spur support from regional and Western peers, further bolstering the capabilities of the military to deter any such threat. Accordingly, Chad is not assessed as facing any existential threats at this time, with security risks expected to remain isolated to the shared border areas with Libya, Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon and Nigeria.