Chad – The Battle of Barkaram
- At least 40 soldiers were killed in an attack on a military base near the village of Ngouboua, located on the island of Barkaram in Lac region, on 27 October.
- While unclaimed, the attack was likely perpetrated by fighters from the Boko Haram militant group – which is largely based in neighbouring Nigeria but maintains an operational presence in Chad’s Lac region.
- A broad-based security initiative dubbed Operation Haskanite has since been launched against the insurgents.
- Precedent suggests that the security operation will be of an intensive and sustained nature in islets of the Lac region.
- This operation is likely to curtail militant activity in the Lac region, but may marginally increase the potential for a complex attack in nearby population centres.
At least 40 soldiers were killed in an attack on a military base near the village of Ngouboua, located on the island of Barkaram in the Kaya department of Lac region, on 27 October. The attack reportedly occurred at 22:00 local time, when assailants took control of the garrison, seized weapons, and burned vehicles equipped with heavy arms. In a statement following the attack, president Mahamat Deby ordered the launch of the so-called Operation Haskanite security operation to pursue and track down the attackers. No suspects were named in the presidency’s statement, but the area is close to the border zones of Nigeria and Niger, where Islamist militants are known to operate.
According to international news reports, residents have claimed that the attack was carried out by fighters from the Boko Haram militant group – which is largely based in Nigeria but maintains an operational presence in Chad’s Lac region. Boko Haram has previously claimed responsibility for acts of mass violence in Chad. For example, in March 2020, Boko Haram insurgents killed as many as 98 Chadian soldiers, wounded around 47 others, and captured and/or destroyed dozens of military vehicles in an armed incursion on a military base in the Lac region locale of Bohoma. Following the attack – the deadliest on record against Chadian forces – the former administration of late president Idriss Deby visited the site of the attack.
Similar to his eventual successor, Deby announced the initiation of a broad-based security initiative, coined Operation Boma’s Wrath. Occurring between 31 March and 09 April 2020, and predominately focusing on the Fouli and Kaya departments of Lac region, the operation led to the killing of some 1,000 Boko Haram insurgents, the dismantling and destruction of several militant bases, and the recovery of large caches of weapons, ammunition and equipment.
The Signal
The militant attack on the island of Barkaram was most likely carried out by members of the Boko Haram Islamist extremist group. In recent years, Boko Haram has established its primary operational presence along the islets of Lake Chad, Lac region, where it has emerged as the dominant jihadist force, countering the threat posed by Islamist extremist rivals such as the Islamic State-aligned ISWAP movement. During times of conflict with ISWAP, Boko Haram has often launched high-profile and complex attacks against the Chadian military with the primary aim of garnering weapons, ammunition and related resources to defend their positions against militant rivals. Sources consulted for this briefing noted that the March 2020 attack in Bohoma was undertaken by Boko Haram commander Ibrahim Bakura – the successor to slain former leader Abubakar Shekau – with the intent of garnering weapons to combat ISWAP forces. Since then, Bakura has orchestrated several similar – albeit less fatal – attacks against Chadian forces, distributing the so-called spoils of war to other Islamist militant factions in the region which (at the time) had yet to swear fidelity to him following his assumption of the group’s leadership. Consequently, the attack on Barkaram could be seen as an attempt by Bakura to secure more resources to launch a renewed campaign in the region.
The Barkaram attack is expected to catalyse a broad-based and intensive counter-terrorism operation in Chad’s Lac region. While the parameters of Operation Haskanite remain unclear, it is assessed that the initiative will mirror that of Operation Boma’s Wrath. This will see Chadian forces engage in ground and air operations against Boko Haram positions across the Lac region, with counter-terrorism operations most likely to focus on the Kaya department which hosts islets believed to have been repopulated by insurgent forces. Targeted areas will likely be declared active war zones and be subject to state of emergency, which would necessitate the mandatory evacuation of all citizens from these locales. This will likely cause significant population movements to inland areas of the Lac region, and could increase the potential for militant cells to blend in with civilian communities and infiltrate nearby population centres.
Counter-terrorism initiatives are likely to curtail militant activity in the Lac region, but may marginally increase the potential for a complex attack in nearby urban centres. The consequence of Operation Boma’s Wrath was significant in depleting the operational capacity of the Boko Haram movement; however, despite claims to the contrary, the initiative failed to fully dismantle the group and its operations within Chad. Indeed, a similar scenario is expected with regard to the initiation of Operation Haskanite. While likely to be effective in uprooting militants from islets within the Lac region, insurgents are likely to disperse from these areas as a means of evading what was an expected counter-terrorism operation. As mentioned, civilian communities moving to population centres as refugees could be exploited by Boko Haram militants for possible infiltration, thereby allowing them access to nearby population centres. From here, there is a marginal threat that Boko Haram could respond to Operation Haskanite with acts of targeted violence in such locales. In this scenario, government installations and security facilities could be the target of attacks which may take the form of armed ambushes, suicide bombings, improvised explosive device attacks, and/or kidnappings.