• The ANGE election commission announced on 09 May that interim statesman Mahamat Idriss Deby won the 06 May presidential election.
• Deby secured 61.03 percent of the vote, exceeding the 50 percent needed to avoid a second-round run-off election.
• Deby’s victory was expected, on account of a range of factors – including an uneven electoral landscape.
• The outcome of the vote has been rejected by several opposition politicians and civic groups, which cited instances of fraud.
• Opposition candidates are expected to challenge the outcome of the election at the Constitutional Council; however, this is unlikely to prompt a revision of the results or a re-run of the vote.
• Protests against Deby’s victory are possible in the immediate term, but destabilising unrest is not expected.

The ANGE election commission announced on 09 May the provisional results of the 06 May presidential elections. As per the ANGE, interim president Mahamat Idriss Deby secured 61.03 percent of the vote, followed by prime minister Succes Masra with 18.53 percent. Former prime minister Albert Pahimi Padacke came in third with 16.91 percent. The remaining seven candidates failed to secure more than 1 percent each. Deby’s vote haul exceeds the 50 percent needed to avoid a second-round run-off election. The ANGE claimed that the participation rate in the ballot was 75.89 percent.

Hours before the official announcement of the provisional results, Masra claimed in a live broadcast on Facebook that the election was fraudulent. He cited incidents of intimidation and ballot stuffing, and asserted that he had won the vote. The CONAMM civic group also documented several irregularities with the vote, while roughly 3,000 externally trained domestic observers were prevented from being deployed on the day (no reason was provided). Elsewhere, a soldier was killed by civilians after allegedly attempting to tamper with a ballot box in Moundou (Logone Occidental region). In his broadcast, Masra called on Chadians to mobilise in opposition to the election’s outcome, but to “do it calmly, with a spirit of peace”.

The ANGE denounced these claims and has called for calm. Head of the ANGE, Ahmed Bartchiret, stated in an address on the evening of 09 May that this “crucial period” requires restraint to “preserve the young democracy” of the country. Deby has since accepted his victory. Since the proclamation of the results, there have been no opposition protests; however, mass gatherings in support of Deby took place in N’Djamena shortly after the results were announced. Some of these involved celebratory gunfire.

The Signal

Mahamat Idriss Deby’s victory in the 06 May presidential elections was expected. Deby’s access to state resources allowed him to campaign in all 23 regions, during which the interim president launched new socio-economic projects and engaged with local leaders. The statesman also initiated an array of populist policies ahead of the election, including the suspension of water and electricity tariffs. Deby maintains the backing of local ethnic power structures, which would have been able to partially influence voting among various communities. Equally, Deby was backed by the “For a United Chad” coalition – the largest political collective in Chad’s recent history. The collective’s 200-plus members/groups (of which 100 are from the opposition) would have secured votes for Deby among their smaller but entrenched voting bases. The inclusion of many opposition groups in the collective likely also pulled key votes from prime minister Succes Masra – who himself has a concentrated voting base, as does former prime minister Albert Pahimi Padacke. The regional distribution of votes generally aligns with the historic support bases for Deby (including where he has ethnic allies), Masra and Padacke. The lack of a consensus opposition candidate would have also worked in Deby’s favour. Compounding this is that key opposition groups such as the PSF party, Wakit Tama alliance, Consultation Group of Political Actors (GCAP), and We the People coalition boycotted the vote.

Deby’s victory was also supported by an electoral landscape that was neither free nor fair. Scores of key opposition figures and critics of Deby, such as Nasser Ibrahim Negi Koursami and Chekh Ahmed Saleh, were barred from contesting following the introduction of new candidacy rules. The merits of the reasons for which several key opposition politicians were prevented from contesting have been disputed. Deby also secured the support of myriad opposition groups ahead of the vote, allegedly through monetary incentives or offers of lucrative positions in the new administration. This was enabled by Deby’s access to state resources which, as noted above, also allowed him to initiate populist measures and have a countrywide campaign. On voting day itself, it is likely that various incidents of fraud took place to all but ensure that Deby secured a first-round victory.

Opposition candidates are expected to challenge the outcome of the election at the Constitutional Council; however, this is unlikely to prompt a revision of the results or a re-run of the vote. Once the AGME has announced the provisional tally, losing candidates have five days to petition the Constitutional Council, which must confirm or reject the results by 05 June. While neither Masra nor Padacke has announced their intention to approach the council, they are likely to do so in the coming days given their grievances over the vote. Nonetheless, any petition against the election outcome will be impeded by several factors. Foremost of these is the inability of the opposition to gather sufficient evidence of misconduct. Indeed, the electoral code bars parties from accessing polling station data, and taking photos was prohibited around polling sites. The APGE’s ballot counting process is also not made public or overseen by any opposition representative. A lack of observers for the vote would also impede the ability of the opposition to document sufficient fraud that would warrant a change in the ballot outcome. Finally, the Constitutional Council is populated by allies of Deby, and would unlikely rule in favour of a petition that withdraws the statesman’s victory. To this end, the Constitutional Council is expected to confirm the final results in the coming weeks, well before the 05 June deadline.

Protests against Deby’s victory are possible in the immediate term, but destabilising unrest is not expected. Since fatal anti-government unrest in N’Djamena in October 2021, no major protest action has arisen despite enduring opposition grievances. Efforts by opposition groups to mobilise anti-government protests in March and April in response to fuel price increases were not widely supported, suggesting a limited protest appetite among the population; the absence of any opposition protests in the wake of the results announcement is illustrative of this. The acute presence of military personnel around urban centres, including N’Djamena, is also likely to disincentivise any protests. That said, it appears that the state has made allowance for non-violent demonstrations in the wake of the vote. This could see minor protests occur around legal proceedings against the election, which would centre on N’Djamena. Pro-Masra gatherings are also likely in the country’s second-largest city, Moundou, where there is a greater concentration of support for the candidate. In the event that any demonstrations gather momentum – or devolve into violence – security bodies are expected to respond with a heavy hand, preventing any widespread unrest. Finally, Deby retains the support of Chad’s political and military power brokers (dominated by the Zaghawa ethnic group); Deby’s victory will ensure that existing patronage networks remain secure. As such, there is little incentive for senior military personnel or those within the Zaghawa ethnic group to support any opposition to his victory.