• Former president Laurent Gbagbo and co-accused Charles Blé Goudé have called on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to authorise their unconditional release in order to return to Cote d’Ivoire and register their participation in the country’s 31 October presidential elections.
• Should the ICC comply, the return of both figures to the country and their participation in the ballot could be compromised by warrants of arrest issued by Ivorian courts.
• These indictments – which have extended to former prime minister Guillaume Soro – have raised concerns that President Alassane Ouattara is weaponising the judiciary against his opponents ahead of the ballot. Ouattara’s actions in this regard – and indecision in confirming his participation in the ballot – are serving to increase political uncertainty.

Former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his co-accused, Charles Blé Goudé, have demanded that they be released unconditionally from the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The pair – who have been arraigned at the ICC since their arrest following Cote d’Ivoire’s 2010/11 post-election crisis – presented their demands during a judicial hearing at The Hague, Netherlands, on 06 February.

The court proceedings followed an appeal by ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, against the 15 January 2019 acquittal on war crime charges of both Gbagbo and Goudé. Bensouda has called for a retrial of the pair, while both Gbagbo and Goudé are demanding to be allowed to return to Cote d’Ivoire to participate in the country’s 31 October presidential elections.

Risky returns

Even if the ICC rules in favour of Gbagbo and Goudé’s return, their homecoming could yet be compromised.

On 30 December, a court in the commercial capital of Abidjan found Goudé guilty of war crime charges in a domestic prosecution which has run concomitant with the ICC’s. In addition to rendering a guilty verdict, the court meted out a 20-year prison sentence for Goudé, who in August 2019 established the COJEP movement to lobby support for his presidential aspirations. Goudé’s conviction came just two months after another Abidjan court upheld a guilty verdict issued against Gbagbo.

The October ruling against Gbagbo followed an appeal by his legal team against the former president’s January 2018 conviction on charges of armed robbery related to acts of criminality that reportedly occurred under his command during the 2010/11 crisis. In dismissing the appeal, the court also upheld Gbagbo’s 20-year prison sentence.

Following both verdicts, supporters of Gbagbo and Goudé accused Cote d’Ivoire’s judiciary of being under the influence of President Alassane Ouattara who they claim is attempting to block the participation of key opposition figures in the upcoming presidential ballot.

Ouattara’s actions have only added fuel to such accusations.

For one, the head of state has publicly rejected the idea of Gbagbo and Goudé returning to Cote d’Ivoire, suggesting that their homecoming could significantly deteriorate the country’s socio-political stability ahead of the polls. Consequently, the conviction of both political figures – who would face imminent arrest should they return to Cote d’Ivoire – certainly favours the Ivorian statesman.

Soro’s sorrows

Equally supportive of claims that Ouattara is targeting his political adversaries are charges brought by his government against former ally, Guillaume Soro.

As previously reported, on 23 December public prosecutor Richard Adou issued an arrest warrant for Soro as he was returning to Cote d’Ivoire from an extended stay abroad. In his statement, Adou claimed that Soro was wanted in relation with the embezzlement of state funds during his tenure as President of the National Assembly, in addition to alleged plans of launching a coup d’état against the Ouattara administration. Soro – who diverted his aircraft from Cote d’Ivoire and has since sought self-imposed exile in France – noted that charges brought against him were fabricated by the Ouattara administration.

In fact, Soro is believed to be in the process of challenging these charges at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) and the Community Court of Justice of ECOWAS. He has also noted that a warrant of arrest issued against him will not stop his participation in the October elections and that he is already planning to lead his presidential bid from Europe. Finally, Soro – who supported Ouattara in the 2010/11 crisis by mobilising rebels against Gbagbo’s government – suggested that he would disclose incriminating secrets of the current Ivorian president which could tarnish Ouattara’s reputation ahead of the ballot.

Ouattara’s options

The impact of Soro’s threats may only hold value if Ouattara is actually vested in contesting the election.

Although the president has previously noted his willingness to serve a third term in office, he has yet to formally present his candidacy. Instead, Ouattara’s participation in the October ballot will likely be motivated by spite rather than desire, after he claimed that his candidacy will be dependent on whether former statesmen – namely Gbagbo and Henri Konan Bédié – throw their proverbial hats in the presidential ring.

Constitutional contentions

Outside of his age – with Ouattara turning 78 on New Year’s Day – there are several other factors which may well explain the president’s lack of appetite to serve a third successive term in office.

The first of these stems from his eligibility to participate in the election. While Ouattara has stated on a number of occasions that amendments to the Ivorian constitution in 2016 reset the clock on presidential term limits, his claims remain subject to significant contention given that the constitution itself is opaque on the matter.

In a statement that highlighted the capacity for instability relating to Ouattara’s candidacy, the CRDP opposition coalition – which includes the membership of Gbagbo’s FPI movement and the PDCI-RDA party of Bédié – warned Ouattara to avoid amending the country’s constitution. As per the 20 January statement, the existing tenets of the Ivorian constitution prohibit a sitting head of state from seeking a third term in office. Instead, the only manner in which Ouattara himself would be eligible to contest the 2020 ballot would be by amending constitutional clauses that regulate term limits. The CRDP insinuated that it would mobilise against any attempts by the president to undertake such reforms.

Rifts in the RHDP

In addition to potential unrest surrounding the constitutional legitimacy of his candidacy, Ouattara may also be wary of how the continuation of his presidential tenure could impact the RHDP coalition which brought him to power. Indeed, the issue of who will serve as the ruling coalition’s flagbearer in the forthcoming vote has largely moulded the country’s dynamic and fractious pre-election landscape.

Ouattara’s resistance in nominating Soro or a member of Bédié’s PDCI-RDA movement – which formed part of the RHDP – resulted in both figures breaking ties with the ruling coalition. Schisms linked to the issue of the RHDP presidential flagbearer may also be far from over. Indeed, there is strong speculation that Ouattara may soon initiate another reshuffle of his government which would be aimed at purging cabinet members within the RHDP coalition who harbour their own aspirations of contesting the presidency and are growing impatient with Ouattara’s indecision on his political future.

The Signal

A definitive date for the ICC’s ruling on the application by Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé for their unconditional release has not been disclosed. At this stage, there is an equal probability that the application could be dismissed or assented to.

In the case of its dismissal, Gbagbo and Goudé will remain subject to conditional release. This prohibits them from returning to Cote d’Ivoire pending the continued review by the ICC of the application of prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, to have the January 2019 acquittal of both figures overturned. It should be noted that such a ruling carries the potential to incite immediate-term outbreaks of unrest in Cote d’Ivoire among supporters of both Gbagbo and Goudé who have accused the ICC of collusion with the Ouattara administration. Indeed, on 05 February, the youth wing of the opposition FPI movement stated that it would take undisclosed actions should Gbagbo not be released from custody. These actions are likely to take the form of violent and disruptive protests which – should they occur – will likely centre on the city of Abidjan, particularly the Yopougon area which remains Gbagbo’s primary support base. Protests by Goudé’s COJEP movement are also likely in Abidjan.

Should the ICC rule in favour of Gbagbo and Goudé, the threat of arrest by the Ouattara administration will continue to hamper the return of both figures to Cote d’Ivoire. That said, a favourable ruling will increase pressure on Ouattara by their respective support bases to allow Gbagbo and Goudé to return to the country – and consequently give an indication of the president’s commitment to national reconciliation, which he has championed as a theme ahead of the 2020 ballot.

A possible compromise could take the form of Ouattara providing clemency to both Gbagbo and Goudé on the premise that neither candidate contests the forthcoming ballot. Indeed, such a scenario could benefit both Gbagbo and Goudé, whose electoral chances are compromised by their involvement in the 2010/11 post-election crisis and due to factionalism within their support bases. Meanwhile, Ouattara would nullify the electoral participation of two influential contenders. Such an outcome may yield the most stable solution to the impasse.

However, an offer of clemency is unlikely to be extended to Guillaume Soro who faces charges associated with planning a coup against the Ouattara administration. As Soro’s self-imposed exile has precluded him from standing trial for charges against him – and for which he has not been acquitted by any international or domestic court – Ouattara is under no pressure to provide amnesty to a key political opponent who has sought to isolate himself from key financial and logistical networks which are essential to his successful contestation of the presidential vote.

A concern is that Soro’s continued isolation and diminishing chances of launching a presidential bid could make him more likely to intervene in Cote d’Ivoire’s domestic politics through undemocratic means. In recent years, there has been mounting evidence to suggest that Soro may have orchestrated uprisings within the Ivorian army – in which rebels under his command were assimilated – to demonstrate his influence within the country’s socio-political landscape. Notably, Soro was also indicted by the judiciary in Burkina Faso, which cited him as a co-conspirator in a failed 2016 coup d’état attempt by General Gilbert Diendéré. The incident demonstrated that Soro may possess both the intent and capacity to engage in unconstitutional political acts to advance his own ambitions. Nonetheless, Ouattara has been proactive in nullifying Soro’s influence over the country’s army, notably through the appointment of loyalist, Hamed Bakayoko, as defence minister in July 2017.

At this stage, it is expected that Ouattara will not seek a third term in office and instead hold off on nominating a successor until closer to the elections. This, as a means of maintaining unity within the RHDP movement, which is fracturing due to political jockeying for the position of presidential flagbearer. Moreover, by rescinding a potential third term bid, Ouattara would mitigate what could be significant socio-political instability associated with the constitutionality of his eligibility to contest the forthcoming elections. This, as noted, may well require the incumbent to seek amendments to the Ivorian constitution – a move which would be widely rejected among the country’s key domestic and international stakeholders.

In this regard, it is likely that Ouattara will nominate incumbent prime minister, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, as his successor. Indeed, local reports on 03 February suggested that Ouattara may be in the process of initiating a government reshuffle to purge candidates who may be opposed to Coulibaly’s nomination. One such individual is said to be foreign affairs minister, Marcel Amon-Tanoh, who is seeking to stand as a presidential candidate. Details pertaining to the timing of the reshuffle remain unclear at this stage.

Should a government reshuffle indeed take place, a change of policy positioning by the Ouattara administration is not expected ahead of the ballot.  Indeed, the policy agenda of the government will remain consistent with that outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP), which is premised on ensuring moderate inflation and the management of public finances, through prudent fiscal and monetary approaches. This has been central to the country’s robust economic growth during Ouattara’s tenure, with output set to record a strong 7.3 percent expansion in 2020, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Closer to the election, some populist spending can be expected. This could lead to some slippage of the fiscal deficit, which was equivalent to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2019, according to the African Development Bank. However, overall policy consistency anchored on the NDP should be expected, which will likely serve to maintain positive investor sentiment. Barring external or severe political and security-related shocks, this should ensure that the country maintains its positive economic trajectory in the coming months. The country’s debt instruments – which have been relatively immune to domestic political dynamics thus far – should also remain stable. However, developments such as the arrest of Gbagbo, Bédié and/or Soro – or unconstitutional political acts aimed at state destabilisation – could have a more meaningful negative impact on market sentiments towards the country.