• On 28 May, the International Criminal Court eased travel restrictions for former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and co-accused, Charles Ble Goude, who are awaiting the appeal of their January 2019 acquittal on war crime charges.
• While Gbagbo and Goude are now allowed to return to Cote d’Ivoire, their homecoming remains compromised by domestic court convictions and the required approval of President Alassane Ouattara.
• At this stage, Ouattara is not expected to yield to calls for the return of Gbagbo and Goude, particularly given that the former is seeking to contest the country’s 31 October presidential election as part of a possible opposition alliance.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) on 28 May eased restrictions on former Ivorian head of state, Laurent Gbagbo, alongside his ally and co-accused, Charles Ble Goude. Despite the pair being formally acquitted of war crime charges in a January 2019 ruling by the ICC, the verdict has been challenged by prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.

Pending the outcome of the appeal process, the exonerated Ivorian officials were initially required to limit their movements to European Union (EU) jurisdictions that afford them residence. Although Gbagbo and Goude are now free to travel outside of the EU, they will require the approval of the government of their intended destination prior to departure. Moreover, both figures are mandated to appear at all future hearings related to the appeal of their acquittal.

Celebrations and condemnations

News that travel restrictions had been lifted for both Gbagbo and Goude was met with mixed responses in Cote d’Ivoire.

On 31 May, the Committee of Victims of Cote d’Ivoire (CVCI) civic movement, which represents victims of the country’s 2011 post-election crisis, rejected the ruling and claimed that it was an affront to victims of the violence. The CVCI appealed to President Alassane Ouattara to prevent his political opponents from returning to the country, threatening to organise protests to pressure the administration to heed its demands.

Meanwhile, the 28 May ICC statement was met with celebration within the Yopougon commune of Abidjan, which serves as the epicentre of Gbagbo’s FPI movement and aligned EDS political platform. A day later, key Gbagbo ally and senior figure in the EDS structures, Georges-Armand Ouegnin, appealed to Ouattara to demonstrate his commitment to the spirit of national reconciliation by allowing Gbagbo and Goude to return to the country of their birth. Although not specifically stated, Ouegnin was likely also calling for Ouattara to extend clemency to Gbagbo and Goude, who have both been prosecuted and convicted in parallel domestic court processes and who face the possibility of arrest should they return to Cote d’Ivoire.

Ambling to the alliance

Outside of his own platform, the potential for Gbagbo’s return to Cote d’Ivoire a mere five months before the country’s 31 October presidential election – which seems set to proceed despite Cote d’Ivoire’s domestic coronavirus outbreak – has had implications for the country’s wider political opposition.

On 03 June, a faction of the FPI movement which has remained loyal to Gbagbo took another step closer to forming a political coalition with the PDCI-RDA movement of former Ivorian statesman and ex-RHDP coalition member, Henri Konan Bedie, ahead of the October vote. On the day, the dual parties participated in a National Joint Collaborative Committee, the culmination of which saw representatives of both the FPI and PDCI-RDA inform their constituents that the parties should campaign together ahead of the ballot. Cote d’Ivoire’s largest opposition movements further advised their supporters to participate in the voter registration period from 10 to 24 June.

Despite building on their 30 April commitment to enhance political cooperation, neither the FPI nor the PDCI-RDA have formally committed to an electoral alliance, which will be predicated on the registration of a joint candidate to contest the vote against the ruling RHDP’s flagbearer, Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly. This comes as the Gbagbo-loyalist faction of the FPI continues to pitch the former president as its likely candidate – despite the legal challenges impeding his electoral participation – while the PDCI-RDA remains coy on who it will choose as its flagbearer.

Conspicuously, a decision in this regard was set to have taken place on 12 June, when the PDCI-RDA was expected to hold its party primaries. However, on 08 June, the movement noted that it was postponing its elective process to 25 June and that it would finalise its candidate list for the vote – including that of its eventual presidential nominee – by 29 July.

The outbreak outlet

As Cote d’Ivoire’s major political parties focus their vision on the vista of the October polls, the ruling RHDP remains steadfast in its response to the country’s domestic coronavirus outbreak.

As of 11 June, the country had confirmed 4,404 cases of coronavirus, of which 41 have been fatal. Abidjan remains the epicentre of the country’s outbreak, accounting for as many as 85 percent of infections.

In response to the ensuing outbreak, the Ouattara administration on 11 June extended a state of emergency advisory – first imposed in the country on 23 March – until 30 June. Under the emergency decree, the country’s land, sea and air borders remain restricted to passenger movement. Also, proscriptions on recreational facilities such as bars, restaurants and related establishments remain enforced. In Abidjan, regulations have been tightened regarding travel to and from the city, while gatherings of 50 or more people have again been prohibited after allowances were afforded for events of 200 people or less. Authorities have further committed to more rigidly enforcing legislation mandating the wearing of face masks in public.

Pricing in the pandemic

In addition to adopting restrictions aimed at mitigating the transmission of the coronavirus, the RHDP-led government has continued to provide welfare mechanisms aimed at cushioning the impact of such regulations.

On 19 May, the finance ministry announced the disbursement of XOF 3.3 billion in relief funding to as many as 45,000 commercial enterprises in both the formal and informal sectors that have been adversely impacted by the coronavirus pandemic.

The disbursement forms part of a XOF 52 billion fund created by President Alassane Ouattara to address the acute economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, which has largely been funded through non-concessional loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and – most recently – the International Development Association.

The Signal

Despite calls for their return, it is not expected that either Gbagbo or Goude will travel to Cote d’Ivoire without the approval of President Alassane Ouattara. At this stage, both Gbagbo and Goude have demonstrated their willingness to engage in conciliatory talks with Ouattara, to which the Ivorian head of state has not responded. Indeed, on 10 June, government spokesman Sidi Tiemoko Toure rejected media claims that the Ouattara administration has been in contact with representatives of either Gbagbo or Goude, instead suggesting that the pair would first need to provide an application to the ICC of their intention to return to Cote d’Ivoire, prior to reaching out to the Ouattara administration.

It is also not expected that Ouattara will grant Gbagbo and Goude permission to enter the country. This is due to the threat of unrest by the CVCI, the fact that the pair’s prosecution process by the ICC has not concluded, and the impact of Gbagbo’s return on the political landscape in the country ahead of the 31 October presidential election. Ouattara’s actions in this regard could incite some agitation by supporters of Gbagbo and Goude – and their wider support bases – who are demanding their return. However, the divisive nature of both figures, particularly within the context of the country’s forthcoming ballot and their respective roles in the 2010 post-election crisis, will limit public participation in any such gatherings. At best, large-scale protests will take place in the Yopougon area of Abidjan, but these events are unlikely to be pervasive, sustained, or capable of destabilising the Ouattara administration ahead of the vote.

A bigger catalyst for unrest would be an ICC ruling prior to the election that formally exonerates both Gbagbo and Goude, allowing their unconditional return to Cote d’Ivoire. In such a scenario, Ouattara will be under more significant pressure given that Gbagbo and Goude would not require his permission to return to the country and – should they do so – the Ivorian president would be obliged to either grant the pair clemency or have them arrested on their domestic convictions. At this stage, no date for the resumption of ICC proceedings has been announced, with the court schedule subject to disruptions by the coronavirus pandemic. It is also not expected that the court process will be concluded before the October election.

In the event that Gbagbo cannot return to Cote d’Ivoire due to judicial hurdles, it is expected that he will back the candidacy of the individual who secures the presidential nomination of the PDCI-RDA over that of his own FPI movement. This is largely due to the fact that Gbagbo’s FPI movement remains significantly split between a faction which supports his continued leadership of the party and another which is aligned with Pascal Affi N’Guessan (who has noted his intention to contest the election on behalf of the FPI, irrespective of whether Gbagbo is allowed to contest the ballot). Consequently, amid tense relations between N’Guessan and Gbagbo, the latter will back the PDCI-RDA candidate, which is largely expected to be former president and octogenarian, Henri Konan Bedie.

While a political coalition between Gbagbo’s FPI and Bedie’s PDCI-RDA would mark an agreement between Cote d’Ivoire’s most influential political parties, RHDP candidate Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly is still expected to secure an electoral victory. This stems from the RHDP’s generally positive management of both the political and economic trajectory of Cote d’Ivoire since coming to power following the disputed 2010/2011 vote, manifest in entrenched political stability, robust economic growth, and the improvement of several human development indices. This effective and transparent governance has been exhibited in the country’s management of its domestic coronavirus outbreak and its associated socio-economic externalities. Outside of pursuing a science-backed approach to the outbreak, the Ouattara administration has also sought to enforce restrictions commensurate with the degree of active infections in the country, while providing welfare relief to both poor households and businesses. The RHDP-led government’s response to its domestic coronavirus outbreak is anticipated to serve as a strong electioneering tool for Coulibaly.

That said, the lead-up to the election will nonetheless be defined by decelerating growth and wider economic malaise, particularly increased unemployment. In a best-case scenario – presented by the government – the pandemic will cut expected growth for 2020 from 7.2 percent to 3.6 percent. However, a more likely scenario is that presented by the IMF, which anticipates annual growth to slow to 2.7 percent. Driving the deceleration is depressed global demand for the country’s mainstay cocoa output, which accounts for roughly 15 percent of GDP and 38 percent of exports. Declining demand for other key exports, including cashews and rubber, will also add to current account and output pressures, offsetting any potential productivity gains from the government’s allocation of USD 410 million to the agriculture industry in April. Beyond exports, suppressed tertiary activity, along with diminishing private and public investment, will add to the slowdown. Despite a relatively sizeable stimulus package, its efficacy in accelerating economic momentum will be diluted by various non-stimulatory (but necessary) expenditures; these mainly focus on healthcare and human resource interventions. What could lend to growth is further fiscal expansion by the ruling party, which is probable ahead of the electoral period. Should this be the case, there would be no immediate or elevated financial stability concerns, given the country’s manageable deficit and debt metrics even after adjustments are made for coronavirus-related support. As per the IMF, the deficit-to-GDP ratio will measure at 5.2 percent, and debt-to-GDP at 42.1 percent in 2020. However, the country is likely to return to a consolidatory path in the medium term.