• In recent days, several soldiers were killed or injured in separate attacks targeting military outposts along Cote d’Ivoire’s borders with Burkina Faso and Mali.
• Although unclaimed, the acts of violence have been attributed to Islamist extremists who have been targeted in joint counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Ivorian and Burkinabe armed forces.
• While it would be premature to suggest that the attacks signal the start of a sustained insurgency in the country’s northern border regions, a continuation of counter-terrorism operations by Cote d’Ivoire will place the country at risk of further punitive attacks.

As many as 12 members of the Ivorian armed forces were killed and eight others wounded overnight on 10/11 June, when their outpost in the Savanes district settlement of Kafolo, located less than a kilometre from Burkina Faso, came under attack by unidentified assailants. Within hours, another attack was recorded on the Gbeya military outpost near the Malian border in the Denguele district on the morning of 12 June. At least two Ivorian soldiers were wounded in the incursion on the installation, located 600 kilometres from the site of the Kafolo incident.

Warning signs

While there have been no immediate claims of responsibility for either attack, the violence was largely attributed to Islamist extremists known to maintain an acute operational presence in both Burkina Faso and Mali. A statement in this regard was made by Ivorian defence minister Hamed Bakayoko, in the immediate aftermath of the Kafolo attack, which he unequivocally described as “an act of terrorism”. Bakayoko also hinted that his ministry had garnered intelligence which implied that terrorist organisations may have been planning an attack within Ivorian territory.

Although coy on the nature of the intelligence, Bakayoko’s claim that the Ivorian state had forewarning of a potential act of domestic terrorism has been supported by the position of another government. On 03 June, the United States Embassy in Abidjan issued a security message, warning of the increased threat of terrorism along Cote d’Ivoire’s borders with Burkina Faso and Mali. In its statement, the embassy prohibited its staff members from travelling to the country’s northern and north-eastern regions, specifically the following areas:

• Areas more than 10 kilometres north of highway A-12
• Areas within 10 kilometres of the border with Burkina Faso or Mali
• North, east or inside of Comoe National Park
• Northeast of highway A-1, from Ghana’s border to Bondoukou and Comoe National Park at Kotouba

Cellular osmosis

The US Embassy substantiated its security message as being in response to joint counter-terrorism operations being carried out by the Ivorian and Burkinabe militaries along the joint border areas. The most recent of these occurred in mid-May. In the first operation in Alidougou – located 10 kilometres from the Kafolo outpost in Burkina Faso’s Cascades region – a militant camp was dismantled and several militants arrested on 13 May. A day later, a similar initiative was launched on the Ivorian side of the border in the Savanes district settlement of Sangopari; however, the operation was described as unsuccessful, as the militants had reportedly abandoned the camp in question.

Sources consulted for this briefing provided further information on these two security operations. The target of both initiatives was a cell of around 50 Islamist militants who are believed to be members of the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) movement. Led by Amadou Kouffa, MLF is one of the primary constituents of the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) jihadist coalition. MLF and the wider JNIM movement have emerged as the most active Islamist extremist movements in Mali and Burkina Faso. The 50-member cell was reported to be operating in a region straddling the Cote d’Ivoire-Burkinabe border, specifically between the Ivorian city of Ferkessedougou and south of the town of Banfora in neighbouring Burkina Faso.

The failed security operation in Sangopari, meanwhile, was specifically aimed at apprehending the cell’s leader, a Fulani MLF commander identified as Dramane Sibide, with the nom de guerre of “Hamza”, who had been operating out of the Comoe National Park and its immediate surrounds since early 2019.

The Thabat threat

Confirmation that the cell in question was indeed affiliated with al-Qaeda would be provided by the group itself in a 28 May statement. Via its Thabat News Agency, the transnational jihadist movement claimed that Cote d’Ivoire, alongside Algeria, was increasingly enforcing its presence in the Sahel, and that the Ivorian military had directly targeted JNIM positions in its security operations in the Comoe National Park in mid-May.

In the same statement, al-Qaeda issued a warning to the government of President Alassane Ouattara in response to its actions, referencing the March 2016 attack on the Ivorian resort town of Grand-Bassam, in which 19 people were killed and 33 others wounded. JNIM constituents – al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and katibat al-Mourabitoun – cited this attack as direct retaliation for Cote d’Ivoire’s cooperation with France’s Sahelian counter-terrorism campaign.

The Signal

Although yet unclaimed, it is assessed that both the incursions on the Kafolo and Gbeya military outposts were carried out by Islamist extremists, likely aligned with the JNIM Islamist extremist organisation. However, based on the distance between the two locales – in excess of 600 kilometres – it is likely that the incursions were carried out by separate extremist cells. If confirmed, this will counter perceptions that the MLF cell headed by Dramane Sibide is the only militant outfit operating within Ivorian territory at this time.

Whether or not the Kafolo and Gbeya incursions mark the start of a sustained militant campaign in Cote d’Ivoire will largely depend on the government’s response to recent developments. Should the administration of President Alassane Ouattara adopt a defensive approach by suspending its counter-terrorism cooperation with Burkina Faso – and limiting its national security position to bolstering forces alongside its shared borders with Burkina Faso and Mali – the threat of further punitive attacks could be mitigated. However, if the Ouattara administration assumes a more aggressive posture – which is perceived as the most likely outcome at this time – and double-down on joint security initiatives with the Malian and Burkinabe militaries, it could render the country susceptible to further retaliatory acts of violence.

Although such violence will predominantly occur along the country’s northern and north-eastern regions, particularly in and around the Comoe National Park, JNIM may seek to conduct acts of violence against cities and/or interests of socio-political and economic significance. In this regard, interests such as military barracks, Western-branded hotels, shopping centres, foreign diplomatic facilities and even interests associated with Cote d’Ivoire’s 31 October presidential election may be at an elevated threat. It should be noted that Abidjan will remain a particular area of focus for militants, given that the city hosts several of the aforementioned facilities, and on account of its centrality to Cote d’Ivoire’s political and economic trajectories. Indeed, in June 2019, security authorities claimed to have arrested several Malian and Burkinabe nationals who were planning to launch an attack on the city’s Camp Gallieni military headquarters and the Novotel hotel.

That said, it is anticipated that Cote d’Ivoire will be far better equipped to manage its domestic terrorism threat in comparison to Mali and Burkina Faso. Apart from strengthening its counter-terrorism capacity – through initiatives such as the formulation of counter-terrorism legislation, its membership with ECOWAS’s Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and its multiple defence and training agreements with western forces – the country’s stable and largely equitable governance system removes many of the ethno-political and economic grievances which have been exploited by extremist organisations in its northern neighbours. Moreover, the Ivorian armed forces are assessed as having a greater degree of professionalism in undertaking counterinsurgency operations, mitigating the possibility that human rights abuses could provide militants with a window of opportunity to radicalise local populations.

In itself, an elevated terror threat is unlikely to have a significant impact on the country’s economic trajectory, with the ongoing coronavirus pandemic proving far more integral to shaping outcomes. As recently noted, the pandemic will cut expected growth for 2020 from 7.2 percent to as low as 2.7 percent. Driving the deceleration is depressed global demand for the country’s mainstay cocoa output, which accounts for roughly 15 percent of GDP and 38 percent of exports. Declining demand for other key exports, including cashews and rubber, will also add to current account and output pressures, offsetting any potential productivity gains from the government’s allocation of USD 410 million to the agriculture industry in April. Beyond exports, suppressed tertiary activity, along with diminishing private and public investment, will add to the slowdown. That said, a major terrorism development in Cote d’Ivoire would still have a material impact on some key sectors, notably tourism, which has been positioned as a key priority for the current administration (amid goals of attracting 25 million visitors by 2025). Also of some concern is the evolving mining sector, as several of these interests are located in the higher-risk northern regions of the country.