• The military prosecutor indicated on 26 August that the state has sought prison sentences ranging from three to 15 years for 40 military officers accused of plotting a coup.
• The military officers were arrested in April, after being filmed at a hotel declaring an end to president Felix Tshisekedi’s governance and stating that they would seize power.
• The development comes on the back of scores of arrests of military officers in recent months for various alleged infractions.
• The risk of a coup in the near term is considered low.
• The coup risk will gradually increase to low-to-moderate over the medium term.
• The risk of a coup will escalate to moderate over the longer term, particularly as the 2028 elections approach.

The military prosecutor indicated on 26 August that the state has sought prison sentences ranging from three to 15 years for scores of military officers accused of plotting a coup.

In late April, at least 40 military officers – who ranked from captain to colonel – convened in a hotel in the Bandalungwa area of Kinshasa, during which they declared an end to president Felix Tshisekedi’s governance and expressed that they would seize power. This engagement was seemingly filmed by an unknown person, with the video circulated on social media. The officers were subsequently arrested within 48 hours of the video being shared. The accused appeared in a Ndolo prison military court in Kinshasa shortly thereafter, during which the state had initially sought the death penalty for all those involved. The military prosecutor did not account for why the sentences had been reduced; however, it was confirmed that in the cases of several officers, evidence could not sufficiently link them to a coup plot.

The arrests in April prompted what the FARDC described at the time as the launch of a military audit throughout the country. This seemingly prompted what emerged as the arrest of scores of FARDC officers in the following month. During May, for example, various NGOs denounced the arrests of at least 29 senior FARDC officers across the country that month. No rationale was provided for the arrests; however, the bulk thereof have ties to former president Joseph Kabila, who had arrived in the North Kivu provincial capital of Goma in May and subsequently called for regime change. Then in mid-July, the FARDC announced the recent arrest of scores of soldiers for “serious breaches of military discipline”. In a statement posted on social media on 12 July, the FARDC denounced what it claimed to be “treason” and “infiltration” without going into further details.

The Signal

The risk of a coup in the near term is considered low. Recent developments suggest a degree of discord within the military, seemingly owing to president Felix Tshisekedi’s handling of the M23 conflict, during which the state has lost vast territory to the Rwanda-backed rebel group, while the FARDC has suffered notable losses. That being said, such discord is currently not assessed to be widespread or having extended into the senior leadership of the FARDC. Equally, there has been a notable lull in fighting between the FARDC and M23 in recent months pending ongoing dialogue efforts. In addition to this, in March, Tshisekedi authorised pay increases, additional benefits and dependant support for all state security personnel, including police and soldiers. This should afford the statesman goodwill among the security cluster for at least the coming months. Tshisekedi’s allies also currently command senior structures within the FARDC, police and intelligence services; this has allowed for the arrests of mid-tier officers and uncovering of the recent plot in April. Tshisekedi also commands a strong control over the ruling Sacred Union coalition, with little indication of internal discord at this time. These factors should reduce the motivation and ability of any coup attempt within the coming three to six months.

The coup risk will gradually increase to low-to-moderate over the medium-term. This is due to several considerations and developments which may materialise over the coming year. Foremost is the potential for increased arrest of FARDC officers and potential release of those detained. Indeed, the aforementioned arrests highlight a degree of sensitivity on the part on the Tshisekedi administration over the loyalty of FARDC. This could see further arrest operations carried out over the coming months. Possible increased discord within the military associated with the arrests may be exacerbated by failure for the state to prosecute those detained, resulting in their release; this has already been seen with many arrests of high-profile individuals accused of acting against the state in recent months, whereby courts have thrown out the trials due to lack of evidence. Developments related to the M23 conflict may similarly increase contentions within the army. As recently assessed, there is a latent but credible risk of a return to full-scale conflict within the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces should peace talks fail to advance over the coming months. A return to conflict would likely see the FARDC once again suffer notable losses, while M23 would likely extend its territorial gains. This would heighten grievances within both the political and military classes. Conversely, any peace agreement reached with M23 in which it is perceived that the state has conceded territory or the rebel group is afforded greater concessions may incite similar grievances among the public, military and political establishment.

The risk of a coup will escalate to moderate over the longer term, particularly as the 2028 elections approach. Over the coming years, failure for Tshisekedi to resolve the M23 conflict, which has the potential to sustain itself even without a full-scale resumption of military engagements, will likely worsen lingering public grievances with the statesman. This could undermine Tshisekedi’s position within the ruling Sacred Union coalition and the military. This is particularly the case should the state decide to not hold elections due to the M23 conflict; while this has not been suggested, it cannot be discounted given M23’s effective control of two provinces. Perhaps the foremost development that could trigger a coup is the possibility that Tshisekedi will seek a third term. This has been claimed by opposition figures and touted by members of the ruling Sacred Union coalition since Tshisekedi first announced efforts to revise the constitution in early 2024. While proposed to improve the charter given the evolving landscape of the country since the first constitution was adopted in 2006 – following the conclusion of the Second Congo War (1998 to 2003) – opposition politicians have accused Tshisekedi of seeking a third term. The statesman has been coy on such a move, but members of the Sacred Union have pushed for a term extension. Such changes to the constitution cannot take place until a state of siege in North Kivu and Ituri is lifted, which is unlikely in the coming year. However, once the review process begins, any efforts to revise term limits, especially within the context of elevated public grievances, could well trigger a formal coup attempt. Conversely, jockeying within the Sacred Union over Tshisekedi’s succession could equally undermine stability. Perceptions that Tshisekedi’s eventual replacement would undermine senior military personnel’s interests and patronage networks could similarly trigger a coup.