• Transitional president Michael Randrianirina and prime minister Mamitiana Rajaonarison announced a new cabinet on 26 March.
• This follows the dismissal of former prime minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo on 09 March and appointment of Rajaonarison on 15 March.
• The new cabinet retains 17 ministers from the previous government and introduces 13 new figures.
• The appointments reflect a desire to affirm the optics of reform, retain governance continuity, and appease the youth movements; the latter is expected to work in the immediate term.
• However, a change in government is not expected to resolve governance and structural challenges over the medium term.

Transitional president Michael Randrianirina and prime minister Mamitiana Rajaonarison unveiled the new council of ministers on 26 March.

Randrianirina had disbanded the previous cabinet on 09 March and dismissed former prime minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo. On 15 March, Randrianirina appointed Rajaonarison, who was at the time director general of the financial intelligence service (SAMIFIN), as the new prime minister.

The new cabinet retains 17 members from Rajaonarivelo’s government, with 13 new figures introduced. Among the most noteworthy appointments is new foreign minister Alice N’Diaye, who replaced Christine Razanamahasoa. N’Diaye is a career diplomat with experience in regional organisations. Another notable change is the appointment of Radonirina Lucas Rabearimanga, from the Office of Hydrocarbons, as the new minister of energy and hydrocarbons. This appointment comes at a time when Madagascar is facing significant power challenges. No changes were made to other key ministries including finance, mining, and justice.

The Signal

The appointment of Mamitiana Rajaonarison and selection of the cabinet reflects a desire to affirm the optics of reform, appease the youth movements and maintain a semblance of governance continuity. President Michael Randrianirina likely appointed Rajaonarison, alongside the new cabinet, to indicate a prioritisation of fighting corruption and commitment to reforms. Combatting corruption is central to Randrianirina’s agenda and his public commitments since he took power in the October 2025 coup. He has faced calls to act more decisively in this pursuit, most notably from the Gen- Z youth activists who led the protests that preceded his coup. Indeed, the dismissal of the previous cabinet had followed a call from this movement on 07 March for the removal of Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo and dissolution of key institutions (High Constitutional Court, electoral commission CENI, and National Assembly) over a lack of reform momentum and links to corruption-related activities. The president was likely drawn to Rajaonarison because he is a member of the gendarmerie and had served as the head of SAMIFIN since 2021; the agency oversees Madagascar’s efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The new government also partially meets the demands for reform, technocratic competency, and the removal of figures associated with former president Andry Rajoelina. With regard to the latter, Christine Razanamahasoa was a former National Assembly president and had been a long-time Rajoelina ally before falling out with the former president ahead of the 2024 presidential election. Madagascar’s international partners will likely welcome Rajaonarison and the broader government given that it balances calls for reform with several reappointments to ensure stability and continuity in key departments. However, the new prime minister has little relevant experience in civilian government and navigating the complexities of political office. This lack of experience will bring increased scrutiny to his new administration.

The appointment is expected to temporarily appease the Gen-Z youth movement. A collective representing the Gen-Z youth movement had issued a statement on 10 March welcoming the government’s dissolution. The collective also reaffirmed support for Randrianirina and the formation of a new government. The statement suggests that the actions by the transitional president have appeased the youth movement at present, reducing the immediate mobilisation risk but not removing underlying grievances. There has been no immediate reaction from the movement regarding the new government’s composition. The longevity of this appeasement will depend on the actions of the new administration, given that the reset is intended to oversee the broader civilian transition (or refoundation) process. The youth movement will seek to be more included within the political processes and consultations that are driving change and to be a central stakeholder in the slated national dialogue (to be conducted in the latter half of 2026 at local, regional, and national levels). Another core demand will be accountability for misgovernance by Rajoelina-era political officials. Broadly, the reaction to the new government from the youth movement is likely to be mixed. The appointment of Rajaonarison and removal of figures associated with Rajoelina will likely be welcomed. It is unclear, however, if Randrianirina or Rajaonarison consulted with the youth movement ahead of the cabinet’s formation. The reinstatement of 17 ministers of the previous government and no direct intent to address concerns regarding the call for dissolution of several state institutions may fall short of meeting demands for reform. This could once again drive youth animosity over the near term should reform measures by the new government fail to materialise.

A change in government is not expected to fully resolve governance and structural challenges over the medium term. The structural and governance challenges facing Madagascar are deep-rooted and would require longer-term institutional reform. Indeed, despite the Randrianirina administration’s best efforts over five months in power, there are still deep-seated institutional deficits, persistent corruption issues and weak public financial management. The most visible example is JIRAMA, the state-owned water and electricity utility, whose failures were the catalyst for the protests that brought the transitional government to power. To reform this, the company appointed Hajatiana Rasolomanana, a former civil administrator and military officer, as chairman in January. Despite this, there has been no significant change in the functioning of the institution, although any reforms to the entity are only likely to bear fruit over the longer term. The provision of these services is also constrained by infrastructure deficits, though projects related to energy transition – including the Afripower solar parks – are going ahead. There has also been some movement, albeit slow, in reforming the National Assembly. The High Constitutional Court (HCC) stripped five National Assembly deputies of their seats on 24 March for excessive absenteeism. The dismissed legislators denounced the ruling as politically motivated. Four of the five deputies were members of former president Andry Rajoelina’s IRD coalition, and it is likely that this was a politically motivated endeavour. Nevertheless, the complete reformation of the High Constitutional Court, the reconstitution of the National Assembly, and the rebuilding of CENI are also not likely to be resolved in the near term. The scheduling of any plebiscite – although not explicitly stated in the transition timetable – will heighten calls for these reforms once again. Without a credible CENI, there is no viable path to elections that the Southern African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU), or Malagasy public would accept as legitimate.