• A constitutional referendum, proposed by the transitional government, will be held on 17 December.
• Despite extensive opposition to the draft constitution and referendum process, the plebiscite will likely pass in favour of the adoption of a new constitution.
• While protest action organised by opposition groups is expected in the lead-up to the vote, widespread and destabilising unrest is not anticipated.
• While the adoption of a new constitution should inherently strengthen the political position of transitional president Mahamat Deby, his hold on power will remain at threat of insurrection among the military and influential Zarghawa tribe in the lead-up to Chad’s October 2024 elections.

A constitutional referendum will be held on 17 December. The plebiscite is a core prerequisite for the holding of elections in October 2024, which should bring about the conclusion of Chad’s ongoing political transition.

The vote

The organisation of the constitutional referendum is overseen by the National Commission Charged with the Organisation of the Constitutional Referendum (CONOREC). CONOREC was formed on 01 March following approval from the Transitional National Council (CNT) – Chad’s transitional legislature.

CONOREC conducted a revision of the country’s electoral register between July and September in preparation for the vote. The final number of voters was confirmed on 07 November at approximately 8.24 million people.

Registered voters will be required to vote either “yes” or “no” to approve the proposed draft constitution into law. The provisional results of the ballot will be announced on 24 December. These will then be presented to the country’s Supreme Court which will release the final, validated results on 28 December.

A divided charter

Drafting of the new constitution commenced in January, following the conclusion of the so-called Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) process which ran from August to October 2022. The DNIS was the first key pillar of the political transition process established by the Transitional Military Council (CMT) after it assumed power within an hour of the death of former president Idriss Deby on 19 April 2021.

Led by the late president’s son, Mahamat Deby – and comprised of 15 high-ranking generals – the CMT had originally laid out an 18-month transitional timetable meant to conclude with general elections in October 2022.

Following the DNIS, the CMT was replaced by a transitional government led by Deby, who was appointed interim president, and the transition timeline was extended to October 2024. The original transition timeline had to be extended after the peace talks between the CMT and several rebel groups – which preceded the national dialogue – took longer than expected to reach a consensus.

The DNIS was intended to find consensus on key points of the transition, and had the support of several important domestic stakeholders (such as the former ruling MPS party) and some armed groups (including the UFR and UFDD).

The dialogue was, however, boycotted by several opposition actors, including civil society groups (such as Wakit Tama), political parties (such as Les Transformateurs), and rebel groups (such as FACT and CCMSR). This was due to perceptions that the initiative was designed to benefit the transitional government.

Despite this, the transitional process continued to move forward, with the draft charter finalised in June, and ultimately approved by the transitional government on 27 June.

The key tenets of the proposed constitution include:

• The re-introduction of a semi-presidential system with a separate head of state and head of government.
• The re-introduction of a bicameral parliament through the formation of a Senate.
• The adoption of articles that strengthen the independence of the judiciary, with the president of the superior council of the judiciary to be named Supreme Court president (a position which was held by the head of state in the previous constitution).
• The adoption of articles allowing for the High Court of Justice to be an independent institution with the ability to prosecute the president.
• The creation of a National Commission for Human Rights, an independent authority to protect human rights and freedoms.
• The creation of an independent authority to assist in the settlement of political conflicts known as the Mediator of the Republic.
• The adoption of a unitary – as opposed to federal – system of governance for Chad.

Several of these tenets represent changes from the country’s previous constitution, including the re-introduction of a semi-presidential system and a bicameral parliament (which were both clauses included in Chad’s 1996 constitution that had been changed in 2018 under former president Idriss Deby). Nevertheless, the proposed constitution is mostly similar to the previous one, particularly as it still mandates a unitary state.

Whether the state should remain unitary or become federal had been a central debate during the national dialogue. At the conclusion of the national dialogue, a decision had been made to hold a referendum in which the population could vote for the form of state they preferred. However, the draft constitution outlined a unitary state – leaving no room for discussion on the matter. The opposition groups who boycotted the DNIS, which had been in support of a federal system, expressed great disapproval at this, with several opposition groups denouncing the draft constitution as not representing the wider population’s interests.

Boycott

The issue surrounding a unitary or federal state is one of several contentions raised against the charter by opposition forces; apart from this issue, most qualms raised by the opposition have related to a perceived exclusion from the constitution process rather than surrounding the contents of the constitution itself. The opposition has criticised the composition of CONOREC, arguing that the commission is not sufficiently independent from the transitional government, as all of its commissioners were appointed by Deby. They have argued that, as not all actors were involved in the dialogue process and CONOREC itself is made up of those they perceive to be government loyalists, the proposed constitution cannot be seen as valid.

This criticism extended to the voter registration process carried out by CONOREC after observers of the registration drive noted several irregularities. For example, civil society group, the Independent Media Platform for Peaceful Elections in Chad (PMIAT), confirmed in a report released on 10 November that it had witnessed several anomalies during the registration process. These included an insufficient number of enrolment kits, unskilled registration operators, and a lack of media involvement. The opposition have used these irregularities to argue that the referendum will not be free, fair and transparent.

In light of these contentions, various opposition parties have announced plans to boycott the referendum. A group of political and civic actors calling itself the “republican platform for blocking the referendum process and anti-dynastic succession” led the call for a boycott on 13 September. It announced that it was planning to both boycott the vote and prevent others from reaching the polls. It also proposed launching a 120-day awareness and mobilisation campaign against the proposed constitution.

The political groups involved in this boycott include the Wakit Tama civil society grouping, the RNDT-Le Reveil party, the Credible Opposition Federation (FOC), the Consultation Group of Political Actors (GCAP), and the Republican Platform. The aforementioned groups have pledged to hold meetings and marches in all provincial capitals during the lead-up to the vote, and on 17 December during the voting process itself, to protest against the referendum.

Gaining favour

The transitional government has taken several actions in recent months in an apparent bid to gain favour with the opposition in the lead-up to the referendum. Notably, it signed an agreement on 31 October with several opposition figures who had been in exile since October 2022 to allow them to peacefully return to Chad. The returnees included leader of key opposition party Les Transformateurs, Succes Masra, who arrived in Chad on 03 November to a welcome from several government officials, including national reconciliation minister Abderaman Koulamallah and communication minister Aziz Mahamat Saleh.

The opposition figures in exile had fled Chad after being accused by the government of insurrection following anti-government demonstrations on 20 October 2022 that led to the deaths of over 60 people after security forces fired at the protesters. The demonstrations had occurred in reaction to a perception among opposition groups that they had been side-lined during the national dialogue process. In what appeared to be another conciliatory gesture, Deby announced on 28 June that he was pardoning all individuals involved in the 20 October 2022 unrest, including those who had already been convicted on related charges.

These developments have been accepted positively by some opposition groups, particularly Les Transformateurs. Following Masra’s return to Chad, the party has appeared more supportive of the proposed constitution and acknowledged that it was an improvement from the 2018 framework. Nevertheless, Deby’s actions on this matter have also drawn further criticism from other opposition groups which remain resolutely against the constitution and referendum.

Two such groups, Wakit Tama and Les Democrates, denounced the agreement, arguing that they should have been consulted during the process or included in the signing of the agreement, as several individuals from these groups are also in exile. Additionally, Les Democrates expressed doubts that the government was actually committed to allowing the opposition to act freely, as the agreement suggested.

The Signal

The referendum is expected to pass for several reasons. First among these is the decision by key opposition parties to boycott the plebiscite, particularly as there is no voter participation threshold for it to be considered legitimate. Opposition groups such as the Consultation Group of Political Actors (GCAP) and the Republican Platform had initially urged the population to vote “no” instead of supporting a boycott; however, both groups have changed their stance in recent weeks and have also called for a boycott of the plebiscite. One factor working in favour of the constitution is its importance for the overall transition process and the holding of general elections, which are scheduled for October 2024. It is possible that some citizens will choose to pass the constitution in the hope that this will ensure a smoother progression of the democratic transition process. Additionally, the constitution has several apparent merits that may push the population to vote in favour of it. Although it has not provided a federal state system as called for by the opposition, it has included measures that would increase the independence of the judiciary and expand the functions of the legislature in comparison to the 2018 constitution. As a key opposition group, support from Les Transformateurs for the constitution may split the opposition vote and undermine the calls for a unified opposition boycott. Should CONOREC actually lack independence from the government, as perceived by the opposition, the commission itself could attempt to influence the ballot in favour of the constitution being passed.

While protest action is likely in the lead-up to the vote, widespread and destabilising unrest is not anticipated. As mentioned, several opposition parties have already announced their intentions to hold protest marches against the referendum, both on the days preceding the vote and on 17 December. It is expected that these groups will follow through with their plans to demonstrate, with protests most likely to occur in large cities such as N’Djamena and Moundou. While opposition forces in Chad have successfully organised protests attended by hundreds of supporters in the past, opposition gatherings have remained largely limited in scale following the state’s lethal suppression of unrest in October 2022. Although the several opposition parties joining together to protest the plebiscite may amass some support, these protests are likely to remain relatively limited for several reasons. Despite the state’s recent more conciliatory approach towards the opposition, precedent suggests that any protests will be met with a heavy-handed state response. A heightened security presence can be expected in major urban centres immediately before and after the vote as a deterrent to any protests. The state’s expected hard-line response to any opposition protest; a fractured opposition; and a lack of will amongst the general population should offset any destabilising unrest. The risk of insecurity as a result of an attack from one of the rebel groups that have expressed discontent with the transitional process is also unlikely. Although the FACT rebel group announced on 18 August that it was launching an offensive against the transitional government, this has not materialised, and FACT and other rebel groups in Chad are largely seen as lacking the operational capacity to significantly undermine governance processes, including elections.

The expected passage of the referendum should strengthen the political position of president Mahamat Deby. The referendum is largely seen as a bid by Deby to legitimise the reforms introduced in the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) in 2022. The dialogue process concluded with the transitional government being officially established, Deby being named as interim president, and a provision being adopted that allowed all transitional government members to stand in the October 2024 elections. Should the population vote for the constitution to be passed, this will validate the position of the transitional government and allow Deby to claim that he holds the support of the population (regardless of the validity of this statement). This will in turn pave the way for him to run as president. Indeed, although the new constitution will be an improvement over the last in terms of provisions to decentralise power, its mandate of a unitary (rather than federal) state system will still ensure that Deby continues to largely centralise political power through the office of the executive.

That said, Deby’s overall political position over the near-to-medium term may continue to be rendered vulnerable. Apart from resistance among segments of the population to a new constitution, there are several other factors which could yet destabilise Deby’s administration ahead of the 2024 ballot. The foremost of these relates to the fidelity of the Chadian army, which is a key powerbroker within the country’s polity. Since assuming power, Deby has enacted several reforms within the armed forces, the most conspicuous of which was the retirement of several commanders who served under his father’s tenure. While likely undertaken to ensure that he has loyalists within key positions, the directive may have fostered discontent within the armed forces given the high degree of influence these individuals wielded. There are also reports of discontent within the military in response to suggestions that Deby may be in discussions with external countries regarding the possible deployment of private military contractors (PMCs) to assist the Chadian armed forces in their counter-terrorism operations. This has raised contention among senior commanders of the Chadian military who perceive the presence of such forces as undermining their authority and potentially fomenting disruptions within their immediate chain of command. Within his native Zarghawa tribe – who have long sought dominance over the country’s political, social and economic institutions – recent policy directives implemented by Deby have also caused discontent. This is particularly the case in relation to the Chadian statesman strengthening relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which was granted rights to an airport in the eastern city of Amdjarass in exchange for financial and logistical concessions. This, amid perceptions that the UAE is a key sponsor of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary force in neighbouring Sudan, which has been accused of committing acts of mass violence against communities ethnically aligned with the Zarghawa. Should Deby lose the fidelity of either the Chadian armed forces or the Zarghawa tribesmen, his administration could be subject to some form of unconstitutional power grab. The threat of such actions is considered particularly elevated within a context of heightened anti-government sentiment that may occur in the lead-up to the October 2024 elections.