• The European Union (EU) announced on 29 November the cancellation of its election observation mission for the DRC’s 20 December general elections.
• The decision was premised on the refusal by the state to allow for various communication technology to be used by the EU’s mission for its long-term observers.
• The EU has indicated that it is engaged in talks with the government to allow for an observation mission to remain in Kinshasa – a request that is likely to be approved.
• The government’s actions are not assessed as being malicious or a bid to actively block the EU’s mission.
• Nonetheless, the absence of what was slated to be the largest foreign observer mission will erode the legitimacy of the vote amid existing claims by the political opposition that the ballot will be subject to fraud.
• There will be an elevated risk of violence over the election cycle; however, destabilising unrest is not expected.

In a communique published on 29 November, the European Union (EU) announced the cancellation of its observation mission for the DRC’s 20 December general elections. The EU cited undisclosed technical constraints that had prevented the deployment of 42 long-term observers to various parts of the country as the reason for its decision. This deployment was initially set to take place on 22 November.

Including these personnel, the EU mission was to amount to around 100 people, rendering it the largest of its kind in the country. Most of the EU mission team had already arrived in country in recent weeks, with its headquarters established in Kinshasa. The long-term observers were the core component of the mission, as they would spend six weeks across 17 of the DRC’s 26 provinces to observe the electoral campaign (which commenced on 18 November), conduct of the vote, compilation of results – which will be undertaken in each voting district – and possible appeals.

Despite the EU’s opaqueness on the matter, local reporting citing diplomatic sources has indicated that refusal for the state to approve the use of certain telecommunications equipment – including satellite phones and mobile internet devices – had prevented the long-term observers from being deployed. For its part, the Congolese government noted that it “regrets the decision by the [European Union] on its own initiative to cancel the Electoral Mission, which occurred at a time when discussions were being held with European Union experts on the practical arrangements for its deployment”.

The statement did not comment on the reason for the EU’s decision to cancel the mission. The government re-affirmed its commitment to accrediting foreign observer missions for the vote, and that it was open to a proposal from the EU to reach an agreement. The EU has since communicated that it is in talks with the state to allow for a smaller mission to observe the vote in Kinshasa and continue to engage with local stakeholders. At present, other international observer missions from the African Union (AU), United States (US)-based Carter Center NGO, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are set to be deployed as planned. These international observer missions will be supported by scores of various local organisations such as the Catholic Church.

The Signal

The government’s actions are not assessed as being malicious or a bid to actively block the European Union’s (EU) observation mission. The process for any entity to be accredited for observing the 20 December elections is two-fold. First, the foreign ministry is contacted with an expression of interest, outlining the intended modality of the observation mission. Once approved by the ministry, it sends the application to the CENI electoral commission, which then reviews and awards the accreditation. However, since CENI first opened the accreditation process in early 2023, the electoral body – and government – dictated that approved bodies would need to ensure they adhere to their authorised mandate and local regulations. At present, it appears that the EU did not confirm in its accreditation application that it would be deploying its own telecommunication systems as part of the observation mission. What seemingly emerged as a drawn-out discussion over the matter is indicative of governance in the DRC when dealing with external actors, namely highly bureaucratic and fraught with difficulties. As discussions lingered, the ability of the long-term EU mission personnel to achieve their mandate diminished, likely prompting its cancellation.

The absence of the long-term EU mission could undermine perceptions of the election’s legitimacy amid existing concerns over the credibility of the process. In the absence of a nuanced understanding of the reasons for the cancellation of what was by far the largest observer mission, local perceptions may deem the development indicative of wider concerns centring on the credibility of the process. Key issues that have emerged ahead of the election include the durability of voter identity cards that were disbursed during the registration period earlier in the year; in recent weeks, voters have complained that ink on the card is fading, while photos are no longer clearly visible. While voters will still be able to use other forms of identification to vote, it has nonetheless raised concerns over manipulation. Second is the independence of the election commission. Led by ally of president Felix Tshisekedi, Denis Kadima, the impartially of the commission has been questioned in the run-up to the vote. While local sources have suggested the Kadima himself has sought to ensure a free and fair vote, his control over the wider commission has been brought into doubt. Third, the Constitutional Court is known to be mostly populated by Tshisekedi loyalists. Finally, vote buying and intimidation by party officials are expected to be features of the election. Altogether, the EU withdrawing from its enhanced mandate may elevate the propensity for disputes once the results are released – ten days after the vote.

That said, mass fraud during the election is still not expected due to several factors. For one, president Tshisekedi is viewed as having sufficient support to secure re-election without needing to overtly manipulate the vote. Equally, in other legs of the elections – including the legislative, provincial assembly and councillor ballots – political interests are highly localised and centred on individuals as opposed to parties. This should reduce the likelihood of mass manipulation at these levels of the vote. Second, the Tshisekedi administration is highly cognisant that any evidence of mass fraud could result in punitive measures by key Western partners – whose economic and development support is key for the state’s economic programme. Third and more importantly, local sources have indicated that government officials are seeking to avoid any imposition of individual sanctions by the EU and US, where the bulk of their financial assets are located. To this end, the US has already threatened that any persons found to be undermining the election will be sanctioned, which entails them being blocked from accessing the US and its assets. Political actors in the DRC are thus expected to avoid being implicated in any major fraud, particularly in an election where the incumbent is likely to win without interference.

There will be an elevated risk of violence over the election cycle; however, destabilising unrest is not expected. In contrast to the 2018 election, incidents of political violence and unrest have been limited in the run-up to the December vote. While isolated clashes between supporters have been reported, there have been no major episodes of violence, with campaigning taking place in a generally peaceful context to date; campaigning will end on the evening of 18 December. As the vote draws nearer, localised incidents of political violence could escalate, particularly in areas that will be tightly contested, including Lubumbashi (Haut-Katanga province), Goma (North Kivu), Bukavu (South Kivu), and Kinshasa. That said, no area of the country is considered immune. The risk for violence will increase on voting day and after the results are announced. The likelihood of disputes emerging will increase in the absence of the EU mission. An expected victory for Tshisekedi will likely prompt claims of fraud by the opposition, and see mobilisation by their supporters. However, what is anticipated to be a lack of mass manipulation will diminish the ability of a generally divided opposition to mobilise any major protest campaign. The competitiveness of the legislative election could equally prompt attempts at mobilisation by losing candidates; however, these support bases are highly localised, which will prevent protest contagion. Heightened security during and after the election will also subdue any major unrest that could materialise.