• The government announced on 22 January that the presidential election will be held on 12 April.
• It is anticipated that the presidential election will secure the CTRI military regime’s hold on power, with interim president Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema likely to stand.
• At this stage, it appears likely that the election will be decided in a single round.
• The risk of notable protests or unrest over the electoral period is limited.
• The organisation of elections will add to existing fiscal constraints in 2025, but this could be somewhat cushioned by improved access to external funding following the conclusion of the transition.

The government decreed on 22 January that the first round of the country’s presidential election will be held on 12 April 2025. Presidential and legislative elections are the last stage of the country’s political transition following the coup that deposed former president Ali Bongo in August 2023. The polls had originally been tentatively scheduled for August 2025. The recent decree did not specify when legislative elections will take place.

Candidates and contentions

The choice of an earlier election date follows the successful passage of a new constitution in a 16 November 2024 referendum. The constitution will officially come into force following the presidential ballot. Subsequently, a new electoral code was adopted in an extraordinary session of the Transitional National Assembly on 20 January. A revision of the electoral roll is also currently ongoing and is set to conclude on 08 February.

No candidates have yet been confirmed for the presidential ballot, but both the new constitution and electoral code have paved the way for interim president Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema to stand in the ballot. The new constitution included a clause to provide amnesty to all members of the CTRI military junta which conducted the August 2023 coup, to ensure that members of the transitional government are not excluded from running for office. Similarly, the new electoral code included a stipulation that military personnel, magistrates and public accountants will henceforth be able to stand in elections, which had previously been prohibited.

The new code also introduced several other significant reforms such as the participation of civil society organisations in elections alongside political parties, the allocation of two National Assembly seats to constituencies of Gabonese citizens living abroad, and a mandate that election results be publicly displayed at each polling station immediately after vote counting.

Oligui Nguema has yet to announce any intention to run for president, but his potential candidacy has been promoted by several political officials. Most recently, former member of Bongo’s PDG party, Fefe Onanga, launched the “coalition of the sacred union of friends of Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema” on 28 December, with the aim of drumming up support for Oligui Nguema’s candidacy in the city of Port-Gentil and surrounding areas. Meanwhile, the minor APG party announced on 20 January that it would campaign for Oligui Nguema’s election in Ngounie province.

Apart from Nguema, former prime minister under Bongo, Alain-Claude Bilie-By-Nze, announced on 25 January that he is prepared to stand in the ballot, but has yet to make a final decision on his candidacy. He affirmed that he would announce his decision on the matter by March. Bilie-By-Nze would stand as a candidate for the “Ensemble pour le Gabon” opposition platform, which was founded by the former prime minister and several other former officials from the Bongo administration in September 2024. Bilie-By-Nze is currently the president of the platform. In addition, the former ruling PDG party – which is now led by Angelique Ngoma after the party officially dismissed Bongo in March 2024 – announced on 25 January that it intends to put forward a candidate in the election, without specifying who this might be.

Last-minute changes

In other preparations ahead of the presidential election, Oligui Nguema undertook a notable government reshuffle on 15 January. The reshuffle saw cabinet expanded to 36 members, up from 31 prior to the changes.

Raymond Ndong Sima and Alexandre Barro Chambrier retained their positions as prime minister and deputy prime minister respectively. In addition, Brigitte Onkanoa was retained as minister of defence, and Regis Onanga Ndiaye as minister of foreign affairs.

New appointments made in the reshuffle included notable former opposition politician Seraphin Akure-Davain as both minister of energy and government spokesperson; army general Flavien Nzengui Nzoundou as minister of state for public works; and Camelia Ntoutoume-Leclercq as minister of state in charge of education and civic instruction. Ntoutoume-Leclercq had previously held the single portfolio of education.

The most significant change made in the reshuffle was that Mark Doumba was appointed as minister of economy in place of Mays Mouissi, who was transferred to the position of minister of environment. Doumba is an economist with several degrees from notable United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) tertiary institutions. He has never before held a political position, but has founded and led various regional banking and digital financial services initiatives. Mouissi had been in the position since the start of the political transition in September 2023.

No funds

No reason was provided for the reshuffle, but the change in leadership in the economy ministry was noteworthy given that it occurred shortly after the country’s ministry of public accounts announced on 13 January that the World Bank had suspended disbursements to Gabon. The World Bank currently has three active projects in Gabon worth a total of USD 214.5 million. The suspension was reportedly undertaken due to debt arrears to an amount of USD 27 million, which the ministry claimed had accumulated due to insufficient resource mobilisation by the state on the international market.

The ministry stated at the time that efforts were underway to clear the arrears in the quickest possible time, but the state has yet to note whether the suspension of funding has been lifted. The World Bank had previously suspended funding to Gabon on a previous occasion in July 2024 as a result of the interim government’s failure to honour overdue payments amounting to more than USD 17 million. On this occasion, the interim administration was able to resolve the payment dispute through a rapid repayment made to the World Bank which allowed for funding to resume.

Debt difficulties

The two funding suspensions from the World Bank highlight the country’s constrained fiscal position, which has caused an increase in delays to debt repayments. An inability to repay debts on time is a particular concern in 2025 as the country has several upcoming debt maturities. These include expected repayments of USD 163.68 million to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and around USD 310 million of a USD 600 million Eurobond which is set to mature in June. The government already repurchased USD 290 million of the Eurobond in November 2024.

Concerns surrounding the country’s debt position were voiced in a recent assessment made by Fitch Ratings on 24 January, in which the credit ratings agency downgraded Gabon’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating (IDR) from ‘CCC+’ to ‘CCC’. According to Fitch, the downgrade reflected concerns surrounding significant pressure on domestic and external government liquidity, as a result of high external amortisations and limited access to the regional debt market, particularly given further upcoming external debt maturities. Fitch also highlighted concerns over increasing delays in payments to suppliers and official creditors, and the subsequent accumulation of debt arrears to bilateral and multilateral lenders. The agency noted that debt arrears to lenders increased by over 0.9 percent of GDP in 2024, while debt arrears to suppliers increased by an estimated 1.5 percent of GDP. Fitch nevertheless estimated that overall debt did fall to 67 percent in 2024, from 71 percent in 2023, due to solid GDP growth and some debt repayments made by the state.

The ratings agency highlighted that a further ratings downgrade could be made going forward should the state fail to secure sufficient support from multilateral institutions, or appear to show a diminishing commitment to servicing commercial debt. In contrast, access to external funding coupled with significant fiscal consolidation or consistently higher state revenue could result in a ratings upgrade.

The Signal 

It is anticipated that interim president Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema will stand in the 12 April presidential ballot. Although the transition leader has not officially announced his candidature, it is widely expected that he will be the frontrunner heading into the vote. Indeed, the transition as a whole has appeared geared towards solidifying Oligui Nguema and the wider CTRI military regime’s executive authority. This has recently been apparent in the changes made to the country’s electoral code and additions to the new constitution, which specifically allowed military personnel and members of the transitional administration to stand for political office. Oligui Nguema’s electoral bid will also be supported by the extensive control he has amassed over the country’s political structures; the transitional president was personally responsible for the appointment of two thirds of the members of the interim Senate and Transitional National Assembly, along with all nine members of the Constitutional Court, in September 2023. Overarching political control will ensure that the interim government is able to closely manage all steps of the electoral process to its advantage, while access to state resources will allow the interim president to undertake a widespread campaign ahead of the election. In addition, Oligui Nguema’s carefully cultivated image as the reformer who brought the country out of the long-standing control of the Bongo family dynasty has afforded the statesman relatively strong popular support, especially among residents from his home Woleu-Ntem province. This is despite the fact that the interim president is a cousin of former president Ali Bongo and formerly served as aide-de-camp to Bongo’s father, former president Omar Bongo. The electoral environment will also likely be imbalanced in favour of Oligui Nguema due to the continued suppression of dissent and opposition interests by the interim administration, which has regularly branded any criticism of the transition process as an attempt to undermine national unity.

At this stage, it appears likely that Oligui Nguema will secure victory in a single round-vote. The new constitution outlines that the presidential ballot should follow a two-round system, and popular opinion appears to be that the upcoming election will be held in this manner. Under this system, a second round between the top two candidates will be held 14 days after the first round’s results are announced (26 April), if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round. Nevertheless, the announcement of the election date on 22 January made no mention of a second round and, as the new constitution will only officially come into force following the election, it is possible that the state will organise the ballot in the single-round system outlined in the preceding constitution (in which the candidate with the most votes wins). Regardless, it is likely that the extensive control over the political environment and a lack of strong opposition candidates will allow Oligui Nguema to secure victory in the first round even if a two-round system is employed. The most notable opposition challenger, should he choose to stand, would likely be Albert Ondo Ossa. Ossa came second in the disputed August 2023 election, with 31 percent of the vote behind Bongo’s 64.27 percent, but he has continued to claim that the election was rigged and that he won the vote. Ossa stood in the previous election as a candidate for the new Alternance 2023 platform which was able to gain significant popular support through promoting governance reform and a break from the Bongo dynasty. Ossa appears to retain some popular support from those who view the CTRI regime as too similar to the Bongo administration, but this has diminished somewhat since 2023, with many now viewing the CTRI as the best alternative. Nevertheless, it remains unclear if Ossa will choose to stand in the upcoming election, as he denounced the election on 30 January as unnecessary given that he continues to assert that he is the rightful president, stating that he will push for the election to not take place. Former prime minister Alain-Claude Bilie-By-Nze or any potential candidate from the former ruling PGD party will unlikely pose as significant a challenge due to popular perceptions that they remain aligned with the Bongo administration. As such, it is likely that the presidential ballot will secure Oligui Nguema and the CTRI military regime’s hold on power.

The risk of notable protests or unrest over the electoral period is limited. There will be a stronger likelihood of opposition-led protest action in the lead-up to and during the ballot, but significant protests are not currently anticipated. No opposition group has announced an intention to protest or issued a call to action in recent months despite regular criticism of the CTRI administration. The current lack of protest appetite was illustrated during the 16 November constitutional referendum, which concluded without any notable incidents of protest or unrest. Overall, the transition process has thus far been largely peaceful, with most notable demonstrations in recent years being in support of the transitional administration. In the wake of the August 2023 coup, several demonstrations were organised in support of the CTRI junta in Libreville, and several similar protests have been organised since – mostly against regional and international pushback faced by the military administration. Any protests that do occur in the coming months are expected to be minor and localised to urban centres such as Libreville. 

The organisation of elections could weigh on fiscal stability in 2025. Gabon has been in a somewhat precarious fiscal position since 2022 due to heightened government spending by the Bongo administration to garner popular favour ahead of the August 2023 general elections, followed by elevated social spending by the interim regime after the coup. In 2025, GDP growth is set to drop to 2.6 percent, from 3.1 percent in 2024, due to forecast weaker global oil prices and a resulting decrease in revenue generated from the country’s mainstay oil sector. Lower oil revenue is also set to contribute to a higher fiscal deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP, from 3.89 percent of GDP in 2024. The larger budget deficit is expected to lead to higher debt levels, with government debt set to rise to around 80 percent of GDP from 73.3 percent in 2024. Election-related spending will further increase costs for the state, particularly should two separate elections be organised (with a legislative election date yet to be confirmed). It is also possible that Oligui Nguema will pursue more populist economic policies ahead of the elections. This will likely involve continued efforts by the state to accrue a greater share of revenue for the state from various economic sectors, as has been seen in recent actions such as the state-owned Gabon Oil Company (GOC)’s purchase of a 15 percent stake in the Baudroie oil field from French multinational TotalEnergies in October 2024. It could also involve increased government spending on social welfare and public investment, which will further weigh on state finances. With external and domestic debt repayments set to total around 9 percent of GDP in 2025, any increased pressure on state finances would further limit the state’s ability to honour its debt repayments.

In the absence of sustained fiscal consolidation, the country will be at risk of debt default over the medium term. The recent ratings downgrade by Fitch highlighted that the country is at a high risk of debt distress. This was also illustrated in the latest debt sustainability analysis for Gabon released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May 2024. The IMF noted that an anticipated drop in oil revenue in the coming years could see reserves depleted and total debt increase to over 100 percent of GDP by 2029. The increased legitimacy afforded to the interim administration following elections will likely see the state benefit from improved ties with regional and international partners, which could buoy its fiscal position through additional avenues of funding, and increased trade and investment. Nevertheless, the benefits of this will likely only become more apparent over the longer term, and the government will likely continue to rely on regional banks and the accumulation of further domestic arrears to meet its scheduled repayments for 2025. The state could also seek a new financing arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following the upcoming elections, but the IMF may be hesitant given the country’s significant debt, and an arrangement would therefore be dependent on a satisfactory arrears clearance plan being put in place. Through domestic and multilateral borrowing, along with possible reductions of public spending in late 2025 following the elections, the state should be able to avoid defaulting on its debt repayments in the near term. However, sustained borrowing will heighten the risk of default in the coming years should fiscal policy remain unchanged, as longer-term debt matures and financing becomes more costly.