• An immigration officer was killed on 03 April near the Bawku municipal district town of Missiga in Upper East region.
• The incident came on the back of a deterioration in Bawku’s security environment since November 2021, underpinned by conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups.
• The conflict has endured despite attempts at intervention by the state. Driving the violence has been the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, political considerations, and the apparent influence of criminal actors.
• Conflict is expected to continue and remain largely confined to Bawku; however, indiscriminate and/or targeted incidents of violence could occur in the Upper West and North East regions.
• Over the medium-to-long term, jihadists could enter the conflict if there are any discernible changes to Ghana’s foreign policy or domestic policy; activity in relation to the 2024 elections could also worsen the conflict in Bawku.

On 03 April, an immigration officer was killed – and two of his colleagues wounded – when gunmen opened fire on their vehicle. The trio was travelling near the town of Missiga, located in the Bawku municipal district in the Upper East region, when they came under attack.

Skin in the game

The incident came on the back of a deterioration in the security environment around Bawku – located 12 kilometres from the border with Burkina Faso – since November 2021, underpinned by conflict between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups.

Rooted in history

The sustained period of violence marks the first major flare-up of conflict between the two communities since 2008. The Kusasi and Mamprusi had engaged in various episodes of conflict for several decades over a dispute regarding the Bawku chieftaincy.

Such a position was created in the 1930s by the British colonial government with the intention of developing a new chieftaincy structure in the area now known as the Bawku municipal district. However, the colonial state afforded overall authority to the Mamprusi community’s king, or Nyari, despite the area being inhabited by a large Kusasi population. The Nyari subsequently appointed a Mamprusi as the Bawku chief, who is ultimately responsible for overseeing and installing (or enskinning) all lower chiefs, including those belonging to the Kusasi. Unsurprisingly, this aggrieved the Kusasi.

As such, when the Mamprusi chief died in 1957 – following Ghana’s independence in 1952 – the Kusasis sought to install one of their own as the new chieftain despite the Nyari having already appointed a Mamprusi to the vacant position. This led the two groupings to petition the new CPP government, led by former president Kwame Nkrumah, for a resolution to the chieftaincy dispute. Nkrumah ultimately ruled in favour of the Kusasi, who took control of the chieftaincy in 1958. Nkrumah was eventually removed in a coup in 1966 and the NLC junta took power. The NLC formed a government comprised of Mamprusi and subsequently returned the Bawku chieftaincy to their kinsmen.

Enter, politics

However, another coup in 1979 saw the PNDC junta – which would become the opposition NDC party two years later – eventually allow the Kusasi to regain control of the Bawku chieftaincy post in 1983. The Kusasi celebratory event hailing the NDC’s decision was attacked by the Mamprusi, with the ensuing clashes resulting in at least 37 deaths. In the wake of the decision and violence, the NDC government and Kusasi became increasingly aligned on a local level. This saw Kusasi become NDC members who would subsequently use their influence to bolster Kusasi interests in the areas of trade, markets and goods flows in Bawku – further aggravating tensions.

The politicisation of Bawku escalated further in 1992, when the presently ruling NPP party was formed ahead of the country’s elections in December 2000. The Mamprusi rallied around the new party in hopes that an NPP victory would allow them to undo the NDC’s action in 1983. Ahead of the ballot, the Mamprusi and Kusasi chiefs increasingly aligned themselves with the NPP and NDC, respectively, in a bid to protect their community interests.

Tensions on both sides culminated in violence during the ballot counting process after disagreements emerged between NDC and NPP officials in Bawku over the tally. At least 68 people were killed, with the conflict only subsiding after the deployment of the military and imposition of a curfew. The NPP candidate John Agyekum Kufuor eventually won the elections. Despite Kusasi fears, Kufuor did not prompt a change in the Bawku chieftaincy. Tensions between the two communities nonetheless remained elevated, and indiscriminate clashes continued to be reported. The political nature of the communal contentions once again manifested in violence during Ghana’s 2008 elections, which saw the NDC regain power and its flagbearer John Mahama appointed as president. At least five people were killed in Bawku before the military was deployed and a curfew once again imposed. The NDC administration would go on to facilitate the creation of the so-called Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee in 2009 to serve as a mediator between the Kusasi and Mamprusi.

Flare-up

The creation of such a committee ostensibly underpinned the lull in violence that was observed between the two groups in the years that followed, even over the next three election cycles (2012; 2016 and 2020).

However, in November 2022, the first outbreak of armed conflict emerged in Bawku after nearly 13 years. The cause for the resurgence in violence remains disputed between the Kusasi and Mamprusi. Regardless of which group catalysed the conflict, the ongoing violence is markedly different to previous confrontations. The key difference is that clashes have endured for over a year and half – compared to mere days historically – resulting in over 260 recorded fatalities in and around Bawku.

What authority?

The enduring nature of the conflict comes as the deployment of the military has done little to bring an end to the violence. Indeed, between November 2021 and 05 April, at least 1,900 soldiers have been deployed to Bawku, with a base established in the town’s centre. Equally, a curfew between 20:00 and 05:00 local time has been in effect since November 2021, while military checkpoints have been erected in and around Bawku. Instead of prompting a cessation of conflict, the military deployments have drawn attacks on soldiers and police officers.

This has been particularly prevalent from the first quarter of 2022, whereby military patrols have come under attack, prompting protracted firefights. Illustrative of this, soldiers came under fire from gunmen while conducting a patrol on the outskirts of Bawku on 30 January. At least ten people were killed in the exchange, of which four were believed to have been civilians caught in the crossfire. Then most recently, at least six unidentified gunmen were killed on 13 February in a shoot-out with the military near Bawku.

Underpinning the apparent intensification of the violence has also been the proliferation and utilisation of more sophisticated weaponry. In contrast to the melee weapons and handguns that had defined previous episodes of intercommunal violence, the use of automatic, high-calibre rifles has come to characterise the ongoing conflict. Various reports on the Bawku conflict have suggested that both the Kusasis and Mamprusis have been sourcing and storing weapons over the past decade. The wider Bawku municipal district and surrounding areas serve as a prominent minerals, weapons and human trafficking hub used by militants and criminal actors in the region. In this respect, local reporting has indicated that both the Kusasi and Mamprusi would trade cattle for arms every few months or years, while unknown domestic actors have continued to arm both parties.

Failed intervention

Both communities have also been ostensibly resistant to resolving the crisis. This has been illustrated by several failed attempts at mediated dialogue. Equally, there has been a lacklustre push from the NPP and particularly the NDC to solve the conflict. Although the political alignment of the Mamprusi to the NPP is generally less rigid than in 2000 and 2008, the NDC still commands a strong Kusasi support and membership base in Bawku and northern Ghana. This has possibly been the reason behind the opposition party being generally mum on the issue. The NPP on the other hand has condemned the violence and sought to broker peace agreements. President Nana Akufo-Addo went as far as confirming in mid-2022 his recognition of the Kusasi claim of the Bawku chieftaincy. This and mediation did little to bring an end to violence. Rather, the Mamprusi removed itself from the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee in December 2022, due to what it described as acts of bad faith on the part of the Kusasi. There have been no further mediation attempts since December 2022, with neither party having expressed renewed desire for dialogue in 2023. Tensions have seemingly worsened, culminating in increased fighting since the start of the year and the imposition of goods embargos by the Mamprusi and Kusasi against one another.

External influences

Potentially underpinning this dynamic is that the conflict is no longer driven solely by intercommunal tensions. In an address to the National Assembly on 08 April, defence minister Dominic Nitiwul expressed that the situation in Bawku has become fuelled by criminal actors, some of which were of “foreign origin”, with undisclosed alternative motives. Illustrative of this, the six gunmen that were killed on 13 February were identified as of Burkinabe origin. Meanwhile, local officials in the days that followed confirmed the presence of “armed foreigners” in the fighting.

In his address to parliament, Nitiwul went on to voice his concern over the potential for Bawku to act as a “gateway” for “terrorism” if the situation was not addressed. The minister’s comments in this respect coincided with his disclosure that there had been an attempted use of an improvised explosive device (IED) on a bridge on a main supply route used by the military for their operations in Bawku on 04 February. Although, Nitiwul fell short of linking the dynamics of the Bawku conflict to Islamist extremism.

On the terror trail

That said, it would be remiss to not explore the potential for extremist actors to have involved themselves within the Bawku conflict. This is particularly the case given that violence by these armed actors has occurred less than 20 kilometres from Bawku in neighbouring Burkina Faso, where Islamist militants – most notably those of the al-Qaeda-aligned JNIM movement – are believed to control more than 40 percent of the country. Their expansion in this regard is a combination of both weak state structures but also the ability of these groups to exploit local grievances – and indeed inter-communal tensions – to their favour. Apart from expanding across Burkinabe territory, the same modus operandi has also been employed by extremists to expand their presence outside of the Sahel region into littoral West Africa, as noted by attacks in states such as Cote d’Ivoire, Togo and Benin.

Extremist groups may also be particularly invested in expanding their operations into Ghana for a multitude of reasons. The first of these relates to the raison d’etre of these movements, which often define their relative strength through territorial expansion. Secondly, encroaching on Ghanian territory would also be a direct retaliation to the foreign policy position of the government of Nana Akufo-Addo, which has become a key contributor to regional counter-terrorism initiatives. Finally, Ghana – particularly the country’s northern regions – hosts a number of artisanal mining sites, which groups such as JNIM have long sought to control in order to fund their insurgent operations.

That said, intent may not necessarily infer operational capacity or even presence. At the time of writing, definitive evidence linking extremists to the violence in Bawku appears limited. There have been no claims of responsibility by any militant groups for attacks in Bawku, nor have either the Mamprusi or Kusasi militiamen indicated that they have established any formal ties with these organisations. However, the potential that militants are at least attuned to developments in the flashpoint town was highlighted in 2022, in an audio recording in which supposed jihadists claimed to have entered Bawku via Burkina Faso and moved around the town’s local market incognito.

The supposed militants provided no motivation for why they had entered Bawku, although their movements raised concerns regarding the transfer of both persons and weapons to and from Burkina Faso to the contested locality. This was highlighted in an April 2022 leaked Ghana police memo, which noted that some of the weapons which had led to an intensification of the conflict in Bawku had originated in Burkina Faso and were smuggled across the border. However, the same police memo also noted that while the Bawku conflict could “serve as a conduit for jihadists,” “there are no established links between the Burkinabe fighters and terrorist cells”. Instead, police intelligence noted that external fighters involved in the Bawku conflict were likely to do so less for political or ideological reasons, but likely more due to ethnic linkages or the prospect of financial gain.

The Signal

A conclusion to the Bawku conflict is not expected in the near term due to several factors. Foremost among these is the Mamprusi’s decision to remove themselves from the Bawku Inter-Ethnic Peace Committee, which will significantly complicate efforts to bring both sides to the negotiating table. This is compounded by what are the highest levels of contention between these groups in nearly two decades, illustrated by economic embargoes and persistent attacks against one another. Furthermore, the state’s ability to facilitate a peace accord is hampered at this time given that it is not seen as an independent arbiter. The main opposition NDC’s lack of communication on the matter suggests that it still maintains a degree of alignment with the Kusasi. Although the ruling NPP is generally not aligned, president Nana Akufo-Addo’s public declaration recognising the Kusasi claim to the Bawku chieftaincy has ostensibly heightened mistrust on the part of the Mamprusi. Thirdly, there do indeed appear to be external elements manipulating the conflict, although – as highlighted by police – such actors may be doing so for financial or even ethnic motivations. As such, even if the chiefs seek a peace accord, convincing all actors within each group to cease hostilities will be challenging. While the deployment of additional military personnel could act as a marginal deterrent, precedent suggest this will be insufficient to completely quell the violence. The conflict is expected to continue to be characterised by indiscriminate clashes between the rival groups and armed confrontations with state security personnel – which will pose an acute risk to third parties.

The conflict is expected to remain largely confined to Bawku; however, indiscriminate and/or targeted incidents of violence could occur in the Upper West and North East regions. The communal nature of the conflict and geographic area of control afforded to the chieftaincy will diminish the likelihood of violence spreading beyond the Bawku municipal district. That said, contentions over chieftaincy remain a concern in the wider northern regions of Ghana, many of which are linked. As such, contentions and associated violence in Bawku could spill over or catalyse conflict in the neighbouring Upper West and North East regions. In fact, an ongoing communal dispute in North East region has prompted several armed confrontations in its Chereponi district. Equally, smuggling routes or associated interests in Upper West and North East region could be targeted by the Mamprusi or Kusasi, given the ongoing supply of weapons. Although assessed as far less exposed, targeted acts of violence in relation to Bawku conflict can emerge in Accra or other urban centres such as Tamale. As noted above, local reporting suggests that arms are indeed being supplied by local entities possibly based in these cities (in addition to the northern smuggling networks). Already it was reported on 16 April that a residence of a business owner in Accra was attacked by unknown Bawku actors due to allegations he was supplying arms to one of the communal groups. Further such acts of violence could materialise, but the high level of security within these cities suggests that any attacks will be specific/localised to an individual or property.

Activity in relation to the 2024 elections could worsen the conflict in Bawku. Both the NPP and NDC are preparing for what is expected to be a highly contested December 2024 general elections. This is particularly the case given the economic malaise that has emerged under the NPP, worsening socio-economic conditions in Ghana’s already underdeveloped northern regions. At this juncture, an NDC return to power does appear the more probable outcome. As the NDC seeks to mount a strong challenge to the NPP, the Mamprusi are likely to become increasingly concerned over a return to power by the politically aligned Kusasis, which could further undercut their interests in the region. Furthermore, it is possible that NPP candidates may lean into the historic support of the Mamprusi in the run-up to the polls as a means to enhance their prospects. These historic alignments could be exploited by presidential aspirants to secure local support ahead of the NPP and NDC’s respective primary elections on 04 November and 13 May; Akufo-Addo is ineligible for re-election. As such, while the Bawku conflict is expected to ebb and flow over the medium term, political activity in the coming months could catalyse more sustained and intensive episodes of violence between the Mamprusi and Kusasi, or directed against state interests.

There is no discernible evidence that Islamist militants are embroiled in the conflict in Bawku. As highlighted, an escalation of violence – and even the utilisation of new attack vectors – is more likely an outcome of the Mamprusi or Kusasi better arming themselves than it is an indication of militant actors entering the fray. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that militants may avoid embroilment in the Bawku conflict for strategic reasons. For one, Burkina Faso-based militants may actually be utilising Ghanaian territory as a means of financing their insurgent operations in Burkina Faso through illicit activities such as cattle and fuel smuggling. Engaging in the conflict explicitly could compromise these networks, which provide significant operational and logistical support to the militant war effort in Burkina Faso. Secondly, militant forces would be cognisant that they would face a well-trained and endowed military in the guise of the Ghanian armed forces, which have been deployed en masse in and around Bawku. Engaging in the Bawku conflict risks potentially seeing Ghanaian forces being deployed to Burkina Faso, where they could readily nullify some of the territorial gains made by these groups.

That said, over the medium-to-long term, jihadists could enter the conflict if there are any discernible changes to Ghana’s foreign or domestic policy. Indeed, if logistical and commercial networks maintained by militants are compromised through security operations – as president Akufo-Addo has indicated he will pursue – then extremists could be provoked to undertake punitive violence within Ghanaian territory to protect their interests. Militants could also seek to enter the Bawku conflict should Ghanaian authorities increase their collaboration with Burkina Faso in cross-border counter-terrorism initiatives. Should militant forces indeed enter the Bawku conflict, violence by these entities would likely be directed at targets including security outposts, customs offices, and facilities associated with the Ghanaian Immigration Service (GIS). However, violence could also be directed against ethnic communities indigenous to the aforementioned regions as a means of inciting retaliatory violence against Burkinabe refugee populations that have settled therein. The purpose of such violence – which could target public facilities such as churches, marketplaces or rural homesteads – will be to create ethno-religious cleavages that militant groups can exploit to their advantage, particularly for the purpose of recruitment. Other forms of violence that could occur in Ghana’s northern border areas – including in Bawku – include kidnapping for the purposes of ransom and extortion, which may discriminate against foreign nationals living, travelling or working in these border areas.