• Opposition leader Succes Masra was handed a 20-year prison sentence on 09 August on charges of inciting a massacre.
• The state claimed that an audio recording of Masra catalysed an incident of fatal intercommunal violence in Logone Occidental province in mid-May.
• Masra denied the charges and his legal team indicated an intent to appeal.
• Any appeal to the Supreme Court is unlikely to be successful given that the judiciary is viewed as lacking independence from the administration of president Mahamat Deby.
• The government is also unlikely to face notable domestic mobilisation or international sanctions that could pressure the state to overturn the charges against Masra.
• Masra’s conviction will strengthen the Deby administration’s hold on power, with the government likely to maintain a repressive stance towards dissent.
• The May violence has de-escalated, but intercommunal conflict will remain a key security risk.

Former prime minister and Les Transformateurs opposition party leader Succes Masra was sentenced on 09 August to 20 years in prison on charges of hate speech, xenophobia and inciting a massacre. The court also ordered Masra to pay a fine of XOF 1 billion (around USD 1.8 million). The opposition leader was charged alongside 74 other defendants, 64 of whom also received 24-year prison sentences.

Violent charges

The charges brought against Masra are related to an incident of intercommunal violence on 14 May in the village of Mandakao (Logone Occidental province), which led to 42 fatalities. The clashes pitted members of the Ngambay community (from which Masra hails) against a group of Fulani nomadic herders. The government has claimed that the violence was incited by an audio recording of Masra released on social media, which reportedly included xenophobic language against Fulani herders and called for “revolt” and for citizens to “arm themselves”.

After the clashes in Mandakao, Masra was arrested on 16 May at his home in N’Djamema. Following an initial hearing, he was placed in provisional detention on 21 May. Both Masra and his Les Transformateurs party have vehemently denied the charges. Les Transformateurs released an initial statement on 18 May in which it denounced the charges and claimed that the recording had been manipulated with the use of artificial intelligence.

Masra’s lawyers acknowledged during the court hearing on 10 August that the audio was a recording of the opposition leader’s voice, but claimed that it was recorded in 2023 as a call made by Masra while in exile to urge the Ngambay people to defend themselves against attacks on their farms by herders. The lawyers indicated that the recording was in no way related to the recent violence.

Taking it international

Along with Masra’s domestic prosecution, Chad’s judiciary has also referred the opposition leader to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The country’s indictment chamber announced its decision to do so on 30 July. Thus far, the ICC has issued no response or confirmation that it has received this referral. Masra’s defence team issued a press release on the day to denounce the referral as an “arbitrary measure” and re-affirm its position that the case against the opposition leader is “not based on material evidence or reliable testimony”.

Immediately following the sentencing on 10 August, Masra’s defence team also announced that it was willing to escalate the case in order to appeal the opposition leader’s sentence. The lawyers indicated that they intended to first challenge the ruling through an appeal in the country’s domestic courts. In the event that such an appeal is unsuccessful, the defence team plans to take the case to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

Masra’s lawyers also indicated that they had already notified the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, the French government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights about the case and alleged political motivations underlying it.

A cause for mediation

The defence has argued that international intervention may be required as it views the charges against Masra as being in violation of the 2023 Kinshasa Agreement. This agreement was signed on 31 October 2023 between Les Transformateurs and the administration of president Mahamat Deby to end a political crisis that had persisted since fatal clashes in October 2022. Masra entered into self-exile in October 2022 following the violence, under threat of prosecution, and the agreement allowed him to return to the country. The agreement was mediated by Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi and signed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) capital of Kinshasa.

Masra’s lawyers have claimed that, as the audio of Masra used to prosecute him was recorded in 2023 prior to the signing of the agreement, it falls under the amnesty provisions of the agreement and cannot be used to prosecute Masra. As a result, Les Transformateurs called on 14 August for the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and specifically Tshisekedi, to intervene in the matter and facilitate another round of mediation. This appeal was re-iterated by international rights organisation Human Rights Watch, which claimed on 14 August that the trial against Masra was political, indicative of a lack of judicial independence, and that the situation required mediation by Tshisekedi as the facilitator of the Kinshasa Agreement.

In response, the DRC’s regional cooperation minister Didier Mazenga indicated on 14 August that, while the state was concerned about the situation in Chad, it did not believe that the case constituted a violation of the Kinshasa agreement. Mazenga indicated that the agreement was only meant to be in place for the period of the country’s political transition (which ended with the country’s December 2024 legislative elections) and that it also required Masra to respect the country’s laws.

Down with dissent

Prior to the May 2024 presidential election, Deby had sought to appeal to the political opposition through a series of conciliatory measures. These included the Kinshasa Agreement and the brief appointment of Masra as prime minister between January and May 2024. Following the election – in which Masra was runner-up – this conciliation came to an abrupt end, with Masra replaced as prime minister by one of Deby’s central allies, Allamaye Halina.

Along with Masra’s prosecution, the ministry of territorial administration has also reportedly banned several civil society organisations. This was reported by the Consultation Group of Political Actors (GCAP) opposition collective on 30 July. GCAP did not provide the names of the banned organisations, but claimed that the move was a clear attempt to “silence critical voices”.

Similarly, the government has targeted several journalists and media organisations over recent months. Prominent journalists Olivier Monodji and Mahamat Saleh Alhissein were arrested on 05 and 09 March respectively on charges of providing information to foreign powers. The charges were reportedly related to critical articles written by the two individuals on Chad’s economic position and Russian military operations in Africa. The two journalists were ultimately cleared of all charges on 08 July on the grounds of doubt.

The political opposition also raised concern regarding a presidential decree announced on 23 June, which created a commission to consider re-instating the death penalty. Chad had abolished capital punishment in 2020; this decision was welcomed by national and international human rights organisations. Although no decision has yet been made on a potential re-instatement, the World Organisation Against Torture released a joint statement on 18 August with the Chadian League for Human Rights to denounce the creation of this commission, particularly noting recent incidents of opposition suppression (including Masra’s sentencing).

The Signal

It is unlikely that any attempt by Succes Masra to appeal his prison sentence in a domestic context will be successful. This is due to the seemingly political nature of the case. While Masra’s lawyers appear to have accepted that the audio recording of the opposition leader is legitimate, there seems to be little evidence to directly link it the May incident of intercommunal violence. Overall, intercommunal violence is a relatively frequent occurrence in Chad. Fighting between the Ngambay and Fulani communities over disputes related to cattle and grazing land has occurred previously, reflecting deep-rooted historical grievances. In this context, the case against Masra is likely an attempt by the state to shift blame for its inability to effectively stem intercommunal conflict, while also serving to remove a political challenge against Deby. Masra came in second place behind Deby in the 2024 presidential election, with 18.53 percent of the vote against Deby’s 61.03 percent. His criminal conviction will ensure that Masra is unable to stand for political office over the coming years, which will prevent the opposition leader from amassing any further support or positioning himself as a more significant challenger, with the next election set to be held in 2029. Although the 2023 constitution contains provisions for judicial independence from the executive branch, president Mahamat Deby has notable influence over the country’s judiciary in practise. With respect to the Supreme Court – which would hear any appeal brought forwards by Masra’s lawyers – the court’s president and 20 members are appointed by the Chadian president in consultation with the presidents of the National Assembly and the Senate. Both National Assembly president Ali Kolotou Tchaimi and Senate president Haroun Kabadi are Deby allies and key members of the ruling MPS party; Kabadi is also president of the MPS. As such, it is anticipated that the Supreme Court would uphold the charges against Masra if petitioned.

The Deby administration is also unlikely to face notable domestic mobilisation or unrest which could pressure the state to overturn the charges against Masra. Since Masra’s arrest, Les Transformateurs has held several demonstrations in support of the party leader, this included a recent protest outside the party’s headquarters in N’Djamena during Masra’s trial on 09 August. Nevertheless, these demonstrations have largely been non-violent gatherings at the party’s headquarters, which have attracted dozens to hundreds of party supporters. No significantly large-scale, violent, or disruptive protests have been held by the party to date. Les Transformateurs maintains a relatively notable support base, particularly among urban youth and in the country’s southern regions. This support is not reflected in the party’s legislative representation as Les Transformateurs chose to boycott the December 2024 local and legislative elections. However, the propensity for state security intervention has limited protest action in the country over recent months. Opposition-led protests have been infrequent since the fatal anti-government unrest in N’Djamena in October 2022, and those that have occurred have not been widely supported. It is expected that state security would intervene – likely violently – in any future protest action through the use of tear gas and arrests. This expectation is likely to continue to reduce popular protest appetite going forward.

Equally, the government is unlikely to face significant external criticism over the case. Masra’s case is not likely to be taken up by the International Criminal Court (ICC), as it does not appear to meet the necessary criteria to do so, such as being a case of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The comments from the Congolese government also indicate that regional intervention is unlikely. It is possible that the efforts by Les Transformateurs and Masra’s defence team will attract some international attention to the case. This could lead to critical statements against the government’s actions from human rights groups such as Amnesty International, international organisations including the United Nations (UN), or bilateral partner countries. Nevertheless, the state is unlikely to face more significant pressure, such as sanctions. Previously, international partners have shown a reluctance to implement diplomatic or economic sanctions against Chad. This is partly due to the strength of the country’s army and the central role it plays in combatting insurgency in the Sahel region. As a result, no sanctions were placed on the country following previous incidents of opposition suppression, including when the interim administration was also implicated in the killing of opposition PSF party leader Yaya Dillo in February 2024. As a result, international pressure is unlikely to be sufficient to force the state to overturn the charges against Masra. The state has also shown little willingness to adhere to previous requests from rights groups such as Amnesty International regarding opposition suppression.

Masra’s conviction will strengthen the Deby administration’s hold on power. With Masra unable to contest political office, Deby’s most prominent current rival has been effectively neutralised. The conviction of the opposition leader will also likely weaken his Les Transformateurs party. With Masra incarcerated, the party announced on 16 August that its vice president in charge of women’s engagement, Hoinaty Moh-Ndomal Claudia, will step up as an interim leader. Nevertheless, the opposition party is still relatively new within the country’s political environment; it was founded by Masra in 2018. Les Transformateurs is built around Masra’s leadership, and his absence could weaken party unity and risk disconnecting Masra from his support base. As Les Transformateurs has been the country’s most prominent opposition group in recent years, limitations on its ability to mobilise anti-government sentiment will help to secure Deby and the MPS party’s dominance over the political environment. Accordingly, the case against Masra highlights that the ruling administration is likely to continue to employ repressive tactics such as the arrests of journalists and opposition members and banning of protest action to limit dissent and weaken opposition. Deby has shown some willingness to engage with the opposition; he established a Permanent Framework for Political Dialogue (CPDP) on 02 June to create ongoing dialogue with all parties represented in the legislature. However, Masra’s arrest and sentencing indicate that Deby’s conciliation towards opposition groups will end should they represent a genuine challenge to his government. Deby’s hold on power and ability to control the political environment will remain supported by his strong command over the country’s military. Top military positions are dominated by members of Deby’s Zaghawa ethnic group, and entrenched patronage networks have ensured the fidelity of the security forces to the president.

While the situation in Mandakao has de-escalated at present, intercommunal violence will remain a security risk over the medium term. The government officially mediated a peace protocol between the Ngambay and Fulani communities in Mandakao in July; the document was signed by representatives from both communities on 08 July. The agreement should help to prevent hostilities and restore peace to the area over the coming months. However, precedent suggests that renewed conflict could emerge over the medium term despite the accord, and intercommunal violence will remain a broader security concern in various rural communities across Chad. Indeed, another notable incident of fatal intercommunal violence occurred in Ouaddai province on 14 June, when twelve members of the Ouaddai community were killed in clashes with the Zaghawa community over the theft of a vehicle. Provinces which have experienced incidents of intercommunal violence over recent years include Logone Occidental, Guera, Sila, Mandoul, Ouaddai, and Logone Oriental; such violence is most common in southern and eastern Chad. This violence is generally catalysed by entrenched disputes over land, natural resources, or property. The violence in Mandakao was reportedly started over a long-standing land dispute. These sporadic communal clashes are not expected to escalate into protracted and/or widespread violence but will continue to cause localised disruptions and security concerns. Intercommunal violence is one of several conflict risks within the country’s security environment. Several anti-government groups opposed to Deby, such as FACT or the CCMSR, operate out of southern Libya; although, both groups currently lack the capacity to undertake incursions beyond the border area in Tibesti region. A more notable risk of armed violence will continue to be presented by Islamist extremist groups, most significantly Boko Haram, which maintain an operational presence in the country’s Lac province and regularly carry out attacks on military bases and communities surrounding Lake Chad.